

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FOI/PA# 1326656-0

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FJS:EAD

June 10, 1941

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 DMW/mc/jc
ON 7-13-81

Assistant Director E. J. Connelley
New York, New York

Dear Sir:

Your attention is directed to Bureau letter dated
April 30, 1941, wherein you were requested to interview [redacted]

b7D

It does not appear that this matter has been given
attention by your office. You are therefore requested to im-
mediately notify the Bureau concerning the results of your inter-
view with this individual.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

INDEXED

RECORDED

66-2542-348

66-2542-3-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
3 JUN 10 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FCH

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ JUN 10 1941 ★
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

Copy 2-11. Sub. Airtel.
Lynch, Virgil

CRISE

302 Dillingham Bldg.
Honolulu, T. H.
June 23, 1941

JHP:LT
62-65

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pm

mc/SC

Re: MARITIME INDUSTRY
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Dear Sir:


Reference is made to the report of Special Agent
J. H. Polkinhorn, Honolulu, T. H., dated June 23, 1941, in the
above-entitled case.

The following is the identification of contacts set
forth in this report:

Contact T-1

Contact T-2

Contact T-3



Very truly yours,

R. L. Shivers
Special Agent in Charge

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INDEXED

62-2347-49
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

JUN 25 1941

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

INITIALS ON OTHER PAGE

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CH-2

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CONFIDENTIAL

(J) CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. -- The Bureau in its national defense program and other activities realizes the vital necessity for establishing and maintaining thoroughly reliable and trustworthy mediums through which an expeditious and continuous flow of information concerning persons and organizations whose activities are inimical to the national defense will be available to the Bureau.

This Bulletin has as its purpose the clarification of any confusion that might exist in connection with this essential phase of the Bureau's work, and the instructions contained herein supersede all previous instructions which have been issued on this subject matter, with the exception of Section 8 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, which pertains to "Sources of Information, Confidential Informants, and Contacts."

For the purpose of clarification, confidential informants have been classified into the following three types:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

1. CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS
2. CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS
3. CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS

For further purposes of clarification, the following definitions are set forth, and hereafter the three types of confidential informants will be referred to as set forth in the preceding paragraph:

CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS will be construed to mean those individuals who because of previous or present criminal activities or affiliations are in a position to furnish reliable information to the Bureau concerning criminals or any persons or organizations who have been, are, or anticipate violating general criminal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction, such as the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, the White Slave Traffic Act, the Bank Robbery, Kidnaping, Impersonation and Extortion Statutes, etc.

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS will be construed to mean those individuals who because of previous or present affiliations or associations are in a position to furnish reliable information to the Bureau concerning any persons or organizations engaging in activities inimical to the national defense, such as information concerning sabotage, espionage, Neutrality Act violations, Selective Service violations, and all subversive activities including information concerning Communism, Nazism, Fascism, or any other so-called anti-American "isms."

CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS will be construed to mean those individuals who because of previous or present affiliations or associations and their location in industrial facilities are

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ON 1-22-94

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EXTENDED BY 83-1343
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 1-2-94

Confidential Info in National Defense

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in a position to furnish reliable information to the Bureau concerning any persons or organizations engaging in activities inimical to the national defense, particularly in regard to the individual plants appearing on the Bureau's plant survey priority list, such as information concerning Communism, Nazism, Fascism, etc., and particularly concerning sabotage and espionage in the industrial plants appearing on the Bureau's priority list.

In view of the fact that the Bureau is charged with the responsibility of investigating violations of espionage, sabotage, and other violations affecting the national defense, too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the extreme necessity of establishing and maintaining, immediately, without any delay, reliable informants who will be in a position to inform the Bureau of any activities in which it is interested. The responsibility of investigating general violations of Federal Statutes over which this Bureau has investigative jurisdiction and national defense matters is definitely placed with each Special Agent in Charge, and it is his duty to be informed currently and immediately of all activities regarding violations over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction

Because of the peculiar nature of the Bureau's activities in regard to national defense matters, no CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT shall be established and maintained by any field office if such person or persons have been convicted of a felony.

In the event there is any individual who is presently carried in a field office as a CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT or a CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT who has been convicted of a felony, the Bureau should be advised immediately and this individual should be removed as a CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT or a CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT in that office. However, these instructions should not be construed to discourage the receipt of information regarding national defense matters from any individual, regardless of whether he has been convicted of a felony or not, who voluntarily offers such information to the Bureau. However, if such information is received by the field office and transmitted to the Bureau, the Bureau should be advised of the identity of the individual who voluntarily offered such information, and a general statement should be set out as to his character, reputation, reliability, and whether or not he has previously been convicted of a felony, in order that the Bureau might evaluate the information and be on notice as to the individual's character, reliability, and background.

PROGRESS REPORTS

In order that the Bureau may be currently advised of the activities of the various field offices in the development and maintenance of reliable CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and

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CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS, it is suggested that effective immediately a report be submitted to the Bureau on the 20th of each month reflecting the total number of informants developed by each field office. Two separate and distinct reports should be furnished, namely:

A report on the total number of CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, broken down into the following:

1. Number of informants regarding German or Nazi activities.
2. Number of informants regarding Italian or Fascist activities
3. Number of informants regarding Communist activities
4. Number of informants regarding Japanese activities
5. Number of informants regarding activities of other nationalistic groups
6. Number of informants regarding general un-American activities not falling within the first five groups
7. Total number of CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS developed by the field office (the total of items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)

A separate report should be submitted reflecting the total number of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS developed by the field office in the industrial facilities appearing on the Bureau's priority list, indicating

1. The name of the plant
2. Location of the plant
3. Total number of employees in the plant
4. Total number of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS developed in each plant
5. The grand total of all CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS developed in all industrial facilities appearing on the Bureau's priority list located in the field office district

ESTABLISHING RELIABILITY AND REPUTATION OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS

Before an individual is designated and carried as a regular confidential informant in the field office, appropriate discreet inquiries should be made in order to secure information concerning his background, patriotism, reliability, integrity, and general reputation in the community. Information including data concerning personal history, past and present business connections, character, reputation, loyalty, trustworthiness, and any possible criminal

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record, should be submitted to the Bureau, together with the individual's full name - first name, middle name, and surname - together with the date and place of birth and the field office symbol number assigned to the individual, the latter information being desired by the Bureau in order that an accurate search may be made through the records of the Bureau concerning the individual. The above described information regarding such individuals should be submitted to the Bureau only in letter form. It should be definitely borne in mind that the full responsibility in the establishing of the fact whether an individual possesses a criminal record rests with the field.

If there are any individuals presently carried by a field office as CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS who have not been appropriately investigated in line with the above instructions, and although their names have been submitted to the Bureau previously, appropriate inquiries should be made concerning them and the information should be submitted to the Bureau at once under confidential cover. Special concerted efforts should be made immediately so that the information mentioned above concerning each CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT and CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT carried in each field office will be transmitted to the Bureau immediately.

The above instructions regarding the investigation, selection, and submission of information to the Bureau concerning CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS does not apply to CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS.

In view of the fact that the Bureau does not have jurisdiction over the investigation of intelligence matters on Army and Navy reservations, establishments, etc., it is not desired that CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS be established among Army or Navy personnel or in Army and Navy reservations, establishments, etc., unless the field office is specifically instructed to develop such informants in such establishments by the Bureau. The instructions contained in this paragraph do not apply to CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS.

FIELD OFFICE ADMINISTRATION

That portion of Section 8 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations which pertains to "Sources of Information, Confidential Informants, and Contacts" shall remain unchanged but shall not apply to CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS.

In addition to the file mentioned in Section 8 of the Manual Rules and Regulations, there shall be maintained in each field office a separate 3/5 card index file for CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and a separate 3/5 card index file for CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS. The file pertaining to CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS should be arranged alphabetically by state and alphabetically by plant behind

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each state, with the cards for each plant informant being filed alphabetically behind the card denoting the name of each plant.

The file pertaining to CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS should be indexed as to the types of information which they are capable of furnishing the Bureau.

These files should be maintained in a confidential manner, and care should be exercised so that the identity of the informants will not be disclosed to persons outside the Bureau. The files pertaining to CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS should, however, be available to Special Agents, but should be locked when they are not in use. It is realized that with the large number of informants presently being developed in connection with national defense matters, it will be physically impossible for all of the index cards to be maintained in the exclusive possession and under the direct supervision of the Special Agent in Charge. These files may be maintained in drawers of the regular card index cabinet.

In the event there are any CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS who should be contacted exclusively by a specified Agent of the field office, the card pertaining to such informants should be kept in the exclusive possession and under the personal supervision of the Special Agent in Charge. In such cases, however, a reference card should be placed in the general card index file as to the location of the informants and the type of information which they might be able to furnish, without disclosing their identity, in such a way that the Special Agent who might be desirous of using such informants might be placed on notice that such cards are under the exclusive personal supervision of the Special Agent in Charge.

The index cards, as in the past, should contain the names and addresses of the individuals, organizations and concerns with which they are connected, and an indication of the particular type of information which might be expected. In addition to this information, the cards should also indicate whether the informant is paid, and if so, the date when payment was first authorized, the amount of compensation, and whether payment is on a regular or intermittent basis. If the informant has in the past been designated by symbol, that symbol should also appear on the card.

If for any reason the services of an informant are discontinued, the card should remain in the appropriate file and a notation should appear on the card to the effect that the services of the informant have been discontinued as of a certain date. This procedure is necessary so that informants referred to by symbols in reports may be subsequently identified even though their services have been discontinued by the field office. When the services of an informant have been discontinued, the Bureau should be immediately notified so that a similar notation may be made on the

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index card which is maintained in the Bureau. When a symbol number is assigned to a particular informant, and the services of that informant are later discontinued, the symbol number should not be used again, but should be considered a dead number.

In order to facilitate the work of the Special Agents in the field offices, a cross-reference 3/5 card index file should be maintained of symbol numbers assigned to confidential informants, which cards should be maintained in a separate drawer and should be arranged numerically as to the symbol number assigned to the informant. This will assist the Special Agents in identifying confidential informants who are referred to in reports and other serials by symbol number only.

When any correspondence is addressed to the Bureau concerning informants, it should clearly designate whether the communication is in reference to CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS, CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS, and information concerning only one of the three types of informant should be contained in any one communication. In other words, one communication to the Bureau should not set forth information concerning both CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and PLANT INFORMANTS, etc.

REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE CONTAINING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY INFORMANTS

In the past, certain field offices have followed the practice of merely forwarding to the Bureau information or reports furnished by confidential informants without indicating what action is contemplated by the field in connection therewith, and in some cases have not retained a copy of the reports of the confidential informants. In the future, cover letters transmitting such information should specifically indicate what action is contemplated by the field office relative to each item contained therein. If informants furnish reports concerning violations and individuals, which information is not related, these should be transmitted to the Bureau by separate cover letters, so that the information may be appropriately handled in the Files Section of the Bureau.

All communications addressed to the Bureau concerning confidential informants should be transmitted under confidential cover. The identity of confidential informants who have furnished information to the field office, which information is included in reports which will be transmitted to agencies outside the Bureau, should not be revealed in the reports, but reference should be made to the informants by means of the field office symbols assigned to them. The Bureau will have been advised previously of these symbols if the individuals are carried as regular CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS, CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS, and the Bureau will be in a position to quickly

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ascertain from its records the identities of the individuals who furnished the information.

In the case of information furnished the field office by an individual who is not carried as a regular CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANT, CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT, or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT, and whose identity should not be made known to persons outside the Bureau, the identity of such individual should not be disclosed in reports which will be transmitted to agencies outside the Bureau. In such cases, it will be necessary for the individual to be given a temporary symbol, and the first letter of this symbol should be the letter "T." The Bureau of course in these cases must be advised by a separate communication marked "Confidential," reflecting the identity of such individuals referred to in reports.

DEVELOPMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS

CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS shall not be developed through contact with the plant managements. All CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS in the future shall be developed without the knowledge of such officials and through direct contacts with the prospective informants by the Agents of the field offices. It is only necessary to develop CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS in those plants which appear on the Bureau's plant survey priority list, and the development of a necessary number of informants in any given plant should not be delayed awaiting the actual survey of the facility. This instruction, however, should not be construed to discourage the development of CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS in plants and in other establishments not listed on the Bureau's plant survey priority list.

In order that the Bureau's records regarding CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS might be kept in a current status, the field office should transmit to the Bureau immediately the complete background information required as hereinbefore stated concerning the prospective informant after he has been interviewed and has agreed to cooperate with the field office. This information should not be withheld by the field office until like information has been developed concerning each and every CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT in the field office district.

CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS should be specifically advised that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships, and they should be informed that the Bureau is desirous of securing information concerning possible espionage or sabotage, or any information which would indicate a violation of Federal Statutes within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction, or which would be of interest to the Bureau in connection with the safeguarding of the internal security of the United States. A record should be made in each field office reflecting that each CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT developed has been so specifically advised. The Bureau wishes that

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this matter be clearly pointed out to the prospective CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS so that there will be no misunderstanding regarding the Bureau's position in regard to this matter.

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AND
SOURCES OF INFORMATION

A. AMERICAN LEGION CONTACTS

Individuals contacted in connection with the Bureau's American Legion program are purely sources of information, and they should not be referred to as confidential informants or given symbols as such until they have assumed the full status of a confidential informant of one or more of the three classifications mentioned hereinbefore, and are reporting regularly to your office concerning matters which pertain to the national defense generally or are of interest to your office in connection with criminal investigations. It is possible of course that certain of the individuals interviewed in connection with that program may later be developed to the point where they may be considered as confidential informants in one or more of the three aforementioned classifications. In the event they are developed to the point where they could logically be termed CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS, the Bureau should be furnished the complete background information required for such confidential informants, together with appropriate symbols, in order that these individuals may be identified by the Bureau in future communications.

It is not believed, however, that all of the individuals so contacted in connection with the American Legion program can be considered as confidential informants, and extreme care should be exercised in order that they shall not be classified as confidential informants until they have been established as such.

Each field office shall maintain a 3/5 card index file containing the names of individuals contacted in connection with the Bureau's American Legion program, and these cards should be maintained in a separate and distinct drawer in order to preclude confusion. American Legion contacts should not be given permanent symbols.

B. SOURCES OF INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN PLANTS ON PRIORITY LIST

In addition to the CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS who will include laborers and others who are working in the assembly lines, machine shops, and other productive areas of the plant, it is also deemed urgent that sources of information consisting of officials and other persons serving in supervisory or administrative capacities at the plants, be developed so that they may assist in advising the

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Bureau of any evidences of violations of the National Defense Statutes. However, the distinction between the CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and sources of information in plants should continually be borne in mind, and individuals such as presidents, vice presidents, secretaries and treasurers of plants, plant protection officials, and others who are not desirous of their identity being kept in confidence when reporting information to the Bureau, should be considered only as sources of information, and should not under any circumstances be listed as CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS. The identity of such individuals falling into the category of sources of information in plants should not be transmitted to the Bureau except when the field office reports information furnished by such sources of information, and it is not necessary that the background information, including data concerning character, reputation, integrity, and criminal records be submitted to the Bureau as is required in the case of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, as the Bureau does not desire to maintain records at the Seat of Government concerning the identity of the various sources of information developed in the field.

C. SOURCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMATION OTHER THAN SOURCES OF INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN PLANTS

Here again, as explained in the preceding subsection, a definite distinction should be made between sources of information in national defense matters and CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, and as related before, it is not necessary for the identity of such national defense sources of information to be furnished to the Bureau; nor is it necessary for background information, including character, reputation, integrity, and criminal records to be furnished to the Bureau. For your assistance in distinguishing between CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS and National defense sources of information, it might be well to point out that a member of the Communist Party who is furnishing information regarding the activities of the Communist Party and who does not desire under any circumstances that his identity or relation with the Bureau be generally known, should be considered as a CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT, whereas on the other hand a president of a local bank who in the course of his usual business receives information regarding the Communist Party, but who does not desire that his identity be concealed and who does not care whether any person knows that he furnished information to the Bureau, should be considered as a source of information.

In the event representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence or Military Intelligence Division in the various field office districts should request information concerning the total number of confidential plant informants maintained by the Bureau in industrial facilities appearing on the Bureau's priority list, this information should be furnished to those agencies. However,

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the identities of the CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS should under no circumstances be disclosed to those agencies without prior Bureau authority.

In order that the Bureau might benefit to the fullest extent by the establishment of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS, each field office should take the necessary steps to maintain proper contact with such informants in order to maintain the interest of the informant in his capacity as a Bureau informant, and in order to develop such individuals into better mediums of information.

The Special Agents in Charge will be held responsible for the proper maintenance of contact with CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS and CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS.

DEVELOPMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

It is of course impossible to establish any given set of rules or fixed methods of procedure in the development of confidential informants. It is believed that the success of this important work will depend entirely upon the initiative of the individual Agents and Special Agents in Charge.

It is important and absolutely necessary that Agents maintain frequent contact with their confidential informants. This is necessary not only to establish in those individuals complete confidence in the Agent but also to impress upon the individuals the importance of furnishing information to the Agent. Each Agent in his daily contacts and interviews should bear in mind that every individual he interviews is a potential informant. If he contacts that individual on more than one occasion and receives valuable information, in other words if he assures himself that the individual is "able to produce," he should make appropriate inquiry concerning the individual's background and reputation and if thereafter deemed advisable, he should contact that individual relative to furnishing information on a regular basis to that Agent or other Agents of the office.

Each individual interviewed in this connection should be assured that any information furnished by him will be maintained in strictest confidence and will be used only for official purposes in connection with the Bureau's work. He should also be assured that his identity as a confidential informant will be closely guarded by the Bureau. Particularly in connection with National Defense matters, it should be a comparatively easy matter to convince individuals that they should cooperate with the Bureau by appealing to their patriotism and sense of loyalty to the Government.

In order to secure first hand information concerning various subversive movements which may affect the Internal Security of the

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United States, it is necessary that informants be developed within the membership of those groups. There are always those individuals who, because of mercenary reasons, grudges against the groups, or because of their patriotism and loyalty to the Government, will be willing to keep Agents advised of the groups' activities and plans for future activity.

Care should be exercised in the development of this particular type of informant and no information should be divulged concerning any of the Bureau's projects or confidential undertakings. Informants of this type should not be approached until careful discreet inquiry has been made concerning their general background and reputation. In other words, it should be definitely ascertained that these individuals are no longer loyal to the group with which they are affiliated and that they have some definite reason for cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

If it is found necessary to reimburse certain informants for their expenses or services, and it is believed that the information furnished by these informants is of sufficient value to warrant regular payments, you are authorized to expend an amount not to exceed \$10 per month or \$2.50 per week without prior Bureau authority. In every instance where payments exceed this amount, prior Bureau authority must be obtained. Complete background information should be submitted to the Bureau with a definite recommendation by the Special Agent in Charge as to the desirability of employing any informant who is to receive more than \$10 per month.

It is the definite responsibility of each Special Agent in Charge to closely supervise the activities of all informants under his supervision. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, the Special Agent in Charge should definitely assure himself that full value is being received.

If at any time it appears that the information produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau should be promptly advised. Each informant should distinctly understand that he is not to represent himself as having any connection with the Bureau, and further that any information obtained by him should be secured through his own initiative.

It should also be impressed upon all informants that they should furnish information exclusively to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They should understand that the information obtained by them is of a confidential nature, and therefore should be furnished only to the Governmental agency which has been authorized by the President to accept this type of information.

It is important for each field office to have appropriate coverage in each industrial plant which appears on the priority lists which have been furnished to the Bureau by the Army and Navy and in addition to these CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS every field

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office should exert every possible effort to develop reliable individuals who are in a position to report information concerning possible sabotage or espionage attempts, delay in ship movements, ship fires, and activities on the part of various nationalistic groups.

It is also important that contacts be established to secure information concerning the travel and destination of foreign agents and possible couriers to and from the United States as well as within the continental limits of the United States. Arrangements should also be made to receive advice concerning unusual shipments to and from foreign countries, as well as unusual mail or baggage arriving or leaving the United States. Those offices located on the East or West Coasts should establish selected informants within seamen's groups; shipping company employees; shipping company officers and management; stokers and firemen; longshoremen; dock and wharf workers; draymen; transfer, freight, and taxi drivers; radio operators on ship and shore; scaling company employees; and with the Maritime Commission, commerce and other inspection services. *EW*

In connection with air travel, you should develop contacts to keep your office advised of foreign travel, both incoming and outgoing. All ships entering and leaving the United States should be covered. German, Japanese, Italian and Russian passengers should be ascertained from passenger lists and a report made as to their destinations, hotel addresses, passports and visas, and baggage. When such passengers are aliens, the Bureau should be advised by teletype of pertinent facts if they are departing from the United States. If they are entering the United States, the Bureau and the field office of destination should be advised by teletype, including any recommended action. *EW*

Arrangements should also be made so that the taking of photographs of locations possibly connected with the National Defense, and other suspicious actions by foreigners and other individuals, will be reported to the field office.

As of possible assistance to the various Field Offices in developing a large variety of confidential informants, the following sources, among others, are suggested:

- Telephone companies
- Telegraph companies
- Beer taverns
- Airport managers
- Clubs and dance halls frequented
by servicemen or seamen
- Radio stations
- Tunnel, bridge and port police
- Banks
- Electricians
- Sanitation and Health Inspectors

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Munitions and aircraft plants
Patriotic union leaders
Taxicab companies
Chinatown leaders
National Guard
American Legion
Transportation and shipping
company police
Light, water, and power companies
Plant police
Superintendents of mail carriers
Credit Associations and Agencies
Fire Departments
Organizations or groups of any kind
with large memberships
Hotels
Real Estate agencies
Restaurants
Rental Agencies

It should also be borne in mind that the quality and type of informant developed is far more important than the quantity. Emphasis must be placed on the development of informants who can furnish reliable and accurate information.

Another suggestion which appears to possess considerable merit is that there be recorded in each field division as sources of information friends or associates of Special Agents, who because of the nature of their employment might be in a position to furnish valuable information in the present emergency. For example, persons associated with or employed in the banking business, the brokerage business, and in other types of business having a general contact with the public, might well be informed by Special Agents who are related to or associated with them of the types of information which the Bureau is desirous of securing at this time.

The Bureau has recently furnished each field office with, (1) "List of Important Plants having Contracts with the British Purchasing Commission," and (2) a list of "Civilian Constructed and Operated Plants." It is desired that these two lists be considered by you as a part of the Bureau's priority list in so far as the development of CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS is concerned, and the instructions contained hereinbefore apply equally to these two lists.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

FCH:RMB

June 16, 1941

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Tele. Room _____
Tour Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY *SPK...*
ON *4-22-94*
83-1343

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FOXWORTH

There is attached hereto a statistical tabulation of the status of the Bureau's program of developing Confidential National Defense Informants. This table is set up according to Field Offices.

It will be noted that some Field Offices have a very few informants while others have a very large number. For instance, the Boston Office reports a total of 1,302 Confidential National Defense Informants, while an office such as New York reports only a total of 93 informants. It would appear that Boston is listing a great number of persons as Confidential National Defense Informants who should probably be classified as sources of information, and this matter has been brought to the attention of the Boston Office in order that it might be definitely ascertained that all of the 1,302 informants are actually productive informants of the Bureau. Other offices with unusually large numbers of informants have likewise had this matter called to their attention, while those offices which have relatively few informants have been followed up to secure additional productive informants.

All offices listed have been followed up on this matter in the last few days at which time it was pointed out to them the absolute necessity for the development of adequate coverage of reliable, productive confidential informants, and these offices will be continually followed up on this matter in order that this program of the Bureau might be handled properly in the field, and so that the Bureau will be currently advised of matters pertaining to German, Italian, Japanese, Communist and general un-American activities.

Respectfully,

RECORDED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY *SPK...*
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION *9-15-91*
9-15-81

F. C. Holloman

66-25423-50
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JUN 25 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CH-26

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE *7-13-81* BY *2845*

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R-582 JUL 13 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

AS OF JUNE 5, 1941

DECLASSIFIED BY *8068ja/4ja*
ON *4-22-94*
83-1343

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R 582 JUL 19 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *7-13-81* BY *2842 dmj/meljc*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>GERMAN</u>	<u>ITALIAN</u>	<u>JAPANESE</u>	<u>COMMUNIST</u>	<u>OTHER NATIONALITIES</u>	<u>UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER OF INFORMANTS</u>
Albany	12	11	0✓	12	3	43	81
Atlanta	12	1	1	16	0	53	83
Baltimore	4	3	0✓	16	0	0	23
Birmingham	2	0✓	0✓	1	0	0	3✓
Boston	34	117	14	39	447	651	1302
Buffalo	20	10	2	13	1	11	57
Butte	25	6	6	24	10	0	71
Charlotte	7	4	4	10	2	114	141
Chicago	8	5	4	26	2	1	46
Cincinnati	18	3	0✓	6	0	5	32
Cleveland	19	20	2	24	2	36	103
Dallas	1	1	1	10	3	3	19✓
Denver	3	6	4	11	4	6	34
Des Moines	8	4	0✓	11	2	7	32
Detroit	29	9	1	42	37	172	290
El Paso	16	3	2	8	21	86	136
Grand Rapids	21	12	7	27	17	49	133
Honolulu	9	4	66	6	7	88	180
Houston	9	3	0✓	20	5	8	45
Huntington	4	7	0✓	8	0	23	42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>GERMAN</u>	<u>ITALIAN</u>	<u>JAPANESE</u>	<u>COMMUNIST</u>	<u>OTHER NATIONALITIES</u>	<u>UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER OF INFORMANTS</u>
Indianapolis	5 ✓	2	1 ✓	15	2	6	31
Juneau	0 ✓	1	0 ✓	5	0	150	156
Kansas City	35	6	1	18	0	26	86
Knoxville	0 ✓	0 ✓	1	5	0	0	6 ✓
Little Rock	6	4	1	10	0	0	21 ✓
Los Angeles	58	40	74	94	11	246	523
Louisville	7	3	0 ✓	7	0	7	24 ✓
Memphis	7	2	0 ✓	2	0	9	20 ✓
Miami	43	40	40	43	0	0	166
Milwaukee	17	1	1	10	0	34	63
Newark	15	14	0 ✓	5	0	38	72
New Haven	12	11	1	10	2	25	61
New Orleans	4	2	1	7	0	30	44
New York	54	9	2	19	6	3	93
Oklahoma City	20	0 ✓	2	13	3	143	181
Omaha	8	4	1	19	2	15	49
Philadelphia	5	13	0	9	0	7	34
Phoenix	28	12	21	12	38	155	266
Pittsburgh	7	2	0 ✓	9	1	3	22 ✓
Portland	21	7	9	24	4	112	177

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (w)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>GERMAN</u>	<u>ITALIAN</u>	<u>JAPANESE</u>	<u>COMMUNIST</u>	<u>OTHER NATIONALITIES</u>	<u>UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER OF INFORMANTS</u>
Richmond	7	3	0✓	5	0	64	79
St. Louis	17	10	3	7	5	14	56
St. Paul	105	5	2	70	11	468	661
Salt Lake City	12	1	11	10	2	110	146
San Antonio	11	2	0✓	7	6	126	152
San Diego	12	6	5	6	13	21	63
San Francisco	24	11	10	33	9	101	188
San Juan	14	2	1	4	1	59	81
Savannah	23	4	0✓	39	2	97	165
Seattle	17	5	18	20	2	15	77
Sioux Falls	24	2	2	16	2	19	65
Springfield	24	17	1	29	12	93	176
Washington	5	1	3	15	3	80	107

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

June 24, 1941

Mr. Tolson ☒
Mr. E. A. Tamm ☐
Mr. Clegg ☐
Mr. Foxworth ☒
Mr. Glavin ☐
Mr. Ladd ☐
Mr. Nichols ☐
Mr. Rosen ☒
Mr. Carson ☒
Mr. Drayton ☐
Mr. Quinn Tamm ☐
Mr. Hendon ☐
Mr. Coffey ☐
Mr. Harbo ☐
Tele. Room ☐
Tour Room ☐
Mr. Nease ☐
Mr. Tracy ☐
Miss Beahan ☐
Miss Gandy ☐

PEF:ML

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The National Defense Conference, at which were present Messrs. Tolson, Gurnea, Carson, Collier and Foxworth, considered the attached bulletin to the field requesting that the Bureau be advised not later than July 1, 1941 the number of confidential national defense informants developed who are actually members of the Communist Party, the German-American Bund, or any of the other front organizations whose activities are known to be inimical to the welfare of this government.

Those in attendance were unanimously in favor of the issuance of the bulletin.

Respectfully,

[Signature]
P. E. Foxworth

Attachment

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pm D/mc/lc

RECORDED

66-7542-3-50X

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

FCH:RMB

June 23, 1941

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Tele. Room _____
Your Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FOXWORTH *[initials]*

There is attached herewith a proposed letter to all Special Agents in Charge for approval. A concerted effort is being made by the Plant Survey Section at the present time to secure additional reliable, productive informants, and it is believed that all Field Offices should have individuals as informants who are actually members of the Communist Party and the many front organizations whose activities have been found to be subversive.

It is believed that the attached letter will serve a psychological effect on the Field at the present time, and it is also contemplated that when this information is received that each Field Office will be followed up in order to encourage immediate development of informants in these organizations.

Respectfully,

[Signature]
F. C. Holloman

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 *[initials]*
mc/jc

RECORDED

66-2542-3-50X
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
3 JUL 21 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FOXWORTH

New Haven, Connecticut
June 30, 1941

LLM:WH
100-1335

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Re: [REDACTED]
INTERNAL SECURITY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmb/mc/jc

Dear Sir:

This is to advise that the confidential informant referred to in the report of Special Agent L. L. MEUNIER, dated at New Haven, Connecticut, June 30, 1941, in instant matter is [REDACTED]

b7D

The other informants mentioned are [REDACTED]

For the information of the Bureau, [REDACTED] furnished the information contained in this report in all confidence to Agent MEUNIER and under no circumstances should the New Haven Field Division request assistance in this investigation from [REDACTED]

For the further information of the Bureau, it is noted that [REDACTED] are at sword's point and do not trust one another.

RECORDED

INDEXED

Very truly yours,

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

JUL 10 1941

J. J. McGuire

Special Agent in Charge U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - 6

CH-2

ORIGINAL FILED IN

July 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
TAMM, E. A.
CLEGG
FOXWORTH
GLAVIN
LADD
NICHOLS
CARSON

COFFEY
DRAYTON
EGAN
HARBO
HENDON
HINCE
HOLLOMAN
KIMBALL
KRAMER

LAUGHLIN, R. H.
MURPHY
PATTERSON
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROSEN
TAMM, Q.
TRACY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842pmj
mcljc

RE: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS
CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS
CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

It has been noted from the letters being received at the Bureau that the correct captions concerning the above are not being set forth as desired and explained in Bureau Bulletin No. 17, dated May 15, 1941.

I wish to make it definitely understood that in the future you should distinguish in the captions of your letters the types of informants referred to in the communications, that is, whether they are confidential national defense informants, confidential plant informants, or confidential general investigative informants.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ JUL 11 1941 ★
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

July 2, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
TAMM, E. A.
CLEGG
FOXWORTH
GLAVIN
LADD
NICHOLS
CARSON

COFFEY
DRAYTON
EGAN
HARBO
HENDON
HINCE
HOLLOMAN
KIMBALL
KRAMER

LAUGHLIN, R. H.
MURPHY
PATTERSON
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROSEN
TAMM, Q.
TRACY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pm D/mc/JC

Re: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL
DEFENSE INFORMANTS


Dear Sir:

It is desired that you immediately advise the Bureau of the number of Confidential National Defense Informants which you have developed in your district who are actually members of the Communist Party, the German-American Bund, or any of the other front organizations whose activities are known to be inimical to the welfare of the Government.

It is desired that the Bureau be advised in regard to this not later than July 10, 1941.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director



RECORDED 66-2542-3-50X July 2, 1941

SAC	ALBANY	DETROIT	MEMPHIS	RICHMOND
	ATLANTA	EL PASO	MIAMI	ST. LOUIS
	BALTIMORE	GRAND RAPIDS	MILWAUKEE	ST. PAUL
	BIRMINGHAM	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BOSTON	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BUFFALO	HUNTINGTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BUTTE	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	CHARLOTTE	JACKSON	NEW YORK (E.J. Connelley)	SAN JUAN
	CHICAGO	JUNEAU	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CINCINNATI	KANSAS CITY	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CLEVELAND	KNOXVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SIOUX FALLS
	DALLAS	LITTLE ROCK	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
	DENVER	LOS ANGELES	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	DES MOINES	LOUISVILLE	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

Re: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL
DEFENSE INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

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It is desired that the Bureau be advised in regard to this not later than July 10, 1941.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED


HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2-13-81 BY 2542 DM/ML/TC

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director



July 11, 1941

SAC ALBANY DETROIT MEMPHIS RICHMOND
ATLANTA EL PASO MIAMI ST. LOUIS
BALTIMORE GRAND RAPIDS MILWAUKEE ST. PAUL
BIRMINGHAM HONOLULU NEWARK SALT LAKE CITY
BOSTON HOUSTON NEW HAVEN SAN ANTONIO
BUFFALO HUNTINGTON NEW ORLEANS SAN DIEGO
BUTTE INDIANAPOLIS NEW YORK SAN FRANCISCO
CHARLOTTE JACKSON NEW YORK (E.J. Connelley) SAN JUAN
CHICAGO JUNEAU OKLAHOMA CITY SAVANNAH
CINCINNATI KANSAS CITY OMAHA SEATTLE
CLEVELAND KNOXVILLE PHILADELPHIA SIOUX FALLS
DALLAS LITTLE ROCK PHOENIX SPRINGFIELD
DENVER LOS ANGELES PITTSBURGH WASHINGTON, D. C.
DES MOINES LOUISVILLE PORTLAND QUANTICO

RE: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS
CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS
CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANTS


Dear Sir:

It has been noted from the letters being received at the Bureau that the correct captions concerning the above are not being set forth as desired and explained in Bureau Bulletin No. 17, dated May 15, 1941.

I wish to make it definitely understood that in the future you should distinguish in the captions of your letters the types of informants referred to in the communications, that is, whether they are confidential national defense informants, confidential plant informants, or confidential general investigative informants.

Very truly yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-22-91 BY 2242pmv mca



John Edgar Hoover
Director



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
 Memphis, Tennessee
 July 9, 1941

- Mr. Tolson.....
- Mr. E. A. Tamm.....
- Mr. Clegg.....
- Mr. Foxworth.....
- Mr. Glavin.....
- Mr. Ladd.....
- Mr. Nichols.....
- Mr. Rosen.....
- Mr. Carson.....
- Mr. Quinn Tamm.....
- Mr. Hendon.....
- Mr. Tracy.....
- Miss Gandy.....

EEK:SSN

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 2542 Dm/mc/oc
 ON.....7-13-81.....

Director
 Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS - *Ident. Sub. to letter*

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated June 11, 1941 concerning a program for the development of confidential informants and requesting that there be forwarded to the Bureau memoranda concerning the development of confidential informants as supplied from the experiences had by Special Agents in this office engaged in this work.

In this connection, there are being transmitted to the Bureau herewith memoranda furnished by Special Agent JOHN W. ~~CORE~~, Special Agent (A) G. H. ~~ERTWIN~~ and Special Agent L. E. ~~KINGMAN~~.

Very truly yours,
E. E. Kuhn
 E. E. KUHNEL
 Special Agent in Charge

Enclosures (3)

CH-15

RECORDED 66-2542-3-53
 INDEXED
 JUL 12 1941
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
 FBI

Memphis, Tennessee
July 3, 1941

LEK:MLV

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE:

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

In response to your memorandum of June 26, 1941, I am furnishing the following reflections and observations applicable to the development of confidential informants.

The impressions I have gained from fifteen years' experience in the Bureau's work, is that a very poor way to develop confidential informants is to conduct any intensive drive for that purpose. It has also been my experience, that for confidential informants to be of value, they should be cultivated for a period of time and should be very well known before it is determined whether or not they are of any value. It is also my belief that confidential informants of the type needed in the Bureau work can only be developed by special agents with some background of experience and also with some period of service in the district in which they are working.

I have known of persons to be referred as confidential informants by special agents who lack experience and who may have recently come into a certain district office. First impressions of an informant may have been good, and later this informant would prove to be merely a chiseler and one in whom no confidence could be placed, and whose efforts were valueless. I have had some experience in various field offices where an informant would be developed by a new agent, or an agent recently transferred to a district, and would be paid sums of money for his alleged services, who was well known to the older agent as a fourflusher and chiseler, but whose services had been utilized for some time before the alleged informant was brought to the attention of the older agent.

I have always hesitated to allow my first impressions of a person whom I have just met to control me in recommending him as a confidential informant, because these first impressions may afterwards undergo a radical change with acquaintance.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/mc/jc

66 - 2542 - 3 - 53

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

I believe that any person who is going to be depended upon to furnish confidential information to the Bureau should be checked and double checked, and should be well known for a period of time before he is placed on any list as a dependable confidential informant.

I have found that the confidential informant who furnishes the most information of value is usually one who can only be contacted by some one agent with whom he has formed an acquaintance and in whom he has confidence. The agent, in turn, knows and has confidence in this informant. Some of our most important criminal cases have been solved through the help of confidential informants, and this bears out the above statement. I have found confidential informants to be very reluctant to have any contact with more than one special agent, and they resent being seen by agents who are strangers to them. This theory is borne out further in the practice of members of police departments, who each have their own individual informants. I do not believe the Bureau should discourage any special agent from developing confidential informants who will only work for and develop information for the one agent with whom they are acquainted. I believe that any person who will furnish information to any agent or officer who contacts him should be considered as a general source of information, and that the term confidential informant should be applied only to those who are willing to work for and furnish information for not more than one or two special agents.

I do not have much confidence in a person who will freely and openly discuss a confidential matter with strangers, even though they might be special agents. I have a feeling about this sort of person that he would discuss the same type of information with any other stranger that would question him about any given subject.

Upon going into any new office or territory with which I am unfamiliar, I am hesitant to recommend any one as a confidential informant until I have had many contacts with him and I am completely satisfied that he is dependable.

I believe in testing them out for a while before considering them in such a capacity.

I believe that the work of developing confidential informants in each field office should be left largely to the experienced agents in that office, and to such special agents who have worked in that territory for at least one year or more. I believe that each field office now has in its confidential informant files the names of many persons developed by new agents, who are utterly useless and are not dependable, and who should not be given the feeling that they are in any way associated with special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I believe that the development of such persons has been due to the intensive drive that each office has put on, in which agents in charge have demanded that each agent attached to the office furnish some definite number of confidential informants prior to a certain date. They have accumulated a good number of names, but very few persons that I would consider to be confidential informants.

To sum up my reflections, I would state that I believe the Bureau should strive to have a constant improvement in quality of confidential informants, rather than quantity.

Respectfully submitted,

L. E. KINGMAN
Special Agent

Memphis, Tennessee
July 7, 1941

JWC:SSN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

With reference to your memorandum of June 26, 1941, I am submitting the following observations relative to the development of confidential informants:

At the outset, it appears to me that most Agents recently in the service, but more particularly Agents who have been in the service for many years, are taking the attitude that the offices are not at the present time developing confidential informants of any real value. In this connection it is the writer's observation that the services of confidential informants at present are entirely different from those used in general criminal investigative work in past years and that although the term "confidential informant" may be a misnomer in some instances that it should be impressed on Agents throughout the field that these persons are invaluable, and though not confidential informants in the sense used a few years ago, must be developed with complete information regarding them in order that the Bureau may know with whom various offices are dealing.

At the regular weekly conference of newly-appointed Agents, the writer, with your authorization, scheduled a supposititious interview of a person coming to the office to offer his services to the Bureau. It appeared that this might present workable suggestions and observations. It might be noted that during this interview, the Agent meeting the person offering his services had a tendency to "jump at him." Immediately upon the individual's offering his services, the Agent had a tendency to go into a theoretical discussion of the usage of confidential informants by the office, outlining the ways in which this office might keep an individual's identity confidential; however, there was a complete failure to tell the would-be informant of the nature

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DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 pmu/mc/jc

of the information desired by the Bureau. It was also observed at this time that the Agent endeavored to obtain personal history data by direct questioning and in such a manner as to suggest to the informant that he was being made the subject of an investigation.

good
It is the writer's belief that during the first interview with a person coming to the office to offer his services, whether he appears in the office to enter an application and is found unqualified, but useful as an informant, or if he is in private business and wants to furnish information to the office as a result of his business connections, he certainly should not at that time be led to believe that he is to be made the subject of any inquiry whatsoever. Any questions directed toward his personal history, with a view to determining his value as an informant, should be designed to point out to him the manner in which his work and contacts may result in material of value to the Bureau. In other words, personal data should be brought out during the course of a general conversation rather than by direct questions. Although he should be assured that his identity will not be disclosed at any time, there does not appear to be any reason whatsoever in going into the manner in which this office and the Bureau keeps his identity concealed.

The detective complex informant, who is interested in a number in place of his identity, might of course be given his number after his value is established.

good
The most important one item in handling informants in the writer's opinion is, at the very first opportunity that is presented, to clearly bring to the attention of the informant that he will have no value if his identity becomes known to anyone whatsoever. It has been this Agent's practice, and it is believed it should be the general practice, to outline to every informant the provisions of the Impersonation Statute. In every instance it is made clear to him that not only will his value be impaired by anyone knowing that he is furnishing information to the Bureau, but that also, if he represents himself to have any official connection with the Bureau, every investigative effort will be directed with a view to his prosecution.

good
During the course of the first interview, an individual should be apprized of the type of information that the office desires. Subversive activities and the methods of subversive groups may be discussed generally. Matters he might observe in his business or social life should be brought to his attention. This discussion should not be on any high-sounding or technical line but should give the person a concrete and definite idea of how he may be of assistance.

good
Caution against conducting an investigation or in any way advising members of family, friends or otherwise of any association or connection with the Bureau should be repeated at every opportunity during the interview, and a half dozen or more times is not excessive in this Agent's opinion.

I have been unable to see any objection to advising a would-be informant at the very outset that he might be used on a paid basis if it is clearly pointed out that he will only be paid for value received. It should be clearly indicated to him that he will only be paid on a salary basis after he has proven himself to be of definite worth.

good
All contacts with informants or would-be informants should of course bring out the fact that they, as well as representatives of the Bureau, are primarily interested in preserving and defending the United States. In most instances offer of payment should be avoided because the same amount of assistance can be obtained without the cash stipend.

good
In later contacts with an informant or would-be informant, further personal history data may either be developed from him by direct questioning or by general conversation, depending on the man's position and his personal characteristics as observed by the Agent handling him. Naturally no definite rules can be suggested in handling these contacts.

good
It is believed that as nearly as possible the use of an informant should be made available to the entire office, but as a practical matter it is observed that more success will be obtained in all instances if one informant is limited to being contacted by no more than two or three Agents who may make

the informant acquainted with other Agents upon transfer. It is not believed that any informant, however close to the Bureau and to a particular office, should be "willy-nilly" approached by every Agent in the division.

900
It has all too often occurred that an Agent is taken in by a person who is only anxious to pick up a few dollars on the side. Every Agent who has been in the Bureau for any length of time has personally been taken in by one or more of these chisellers. It appears that it would be a good policy to never put out funds, with possible rare exceptions, until information has actually been furnished, and its accuracy checked. Further, in the handling of informants it has been observed that some Agents, regardless of an individual's status in the community and known excellent character and reputation, follow the policy of telling him nothing and giving him no incentive to continue his endeavors. It appears obvious to the writer that in a great many instances an informant can be told generally the outcome of matters on which he has acted as an informant in such a way that he will be given an incentive toward further work but at the same time not be given any information which would in any way jeopardize the Bureau's position.

Some Agents might be led to divulge valuable information to the great embarrassment not only of themselves but the Bureau as well. Any fact imparted to an informant may later be coupled with his own fiction and made to sound plausible.

I advised all Agents at a recent conference of the position I would take, when acting as Special Agent in Charge in your absence, in regard to any Agent who divulged confidential information to unauthorized persons. I expressed the position that dismissal with prejudice would be recommended in such cases. The discussion particularly concerned the fact that persons of rather well established Nazi sympathies have been to the office purporting to offer assistance, and particular emphasis was therefore placed on the topic. I expressed a similar attitude regarding excessive talking in restaurants or public places concerning Bureau matters, or in reading serials on streetcars, etc., where unauthorized persons would have an opportunity to obtain confidential information. The writer feels very strongly on these sub-

jects and does not believe that too much emphasis can be placed upon them, particularly when national defense items are concerned.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN W. CORE
Special Agent.

Memphis, Tennessee
July 8, 1941.

GHE:MLV

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE:

Reference is made to your memorandum dated June 26, 1941, requesting that a memorandum be prepared concerning the development of confidential informants.

It is a well-known and recognized fact that confidential informants are developed in one of three ways, namely:

1. Through friendship, acquaintanceship, or in return for some favor granted in the past;
2. By buying information;
3. By having the confidential informant under obligation to you.

Confidential informants developed by the friendship method are not developed overnight, but over a long period of time. These informants, when properly developed and contacted, can and will furnish information of value to an office. These individuals are the type which can be contacted in most instances by only one man in the office. They are not individuals who will divulge information to any and every one. Although their names are placed as confidential informants in the office, they have to be contacted discreetly and not promiscuously by all agents. The type of information furnished by these informants is of much value and to obtain this information, they must be handled carefully.

The second type of confidential informant can be obtained by any one in the office, due to the fact that they furnish information strictly for pecuniary gain. These people can be approached by almost any agent in the office at any time and information gained.

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DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 dho/mc/jc

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE:

The third type of confidential informant is the type generally used by the police department, due to the fact that he has violated some minor ordinance or law, and they hold this over his head, somewhat like a whip to make him produce information they desire. This method is not used by Bureau employees, and the only time that confidential informants can be developed by a special agent along that line is to place them under imaginary obligation.

It is the opinion of the writer that mass drives to obtain confidential informants are of little value, because the quality of the confidential informants obtained are of practically no value. In the opinion of the writer, it is better to develop confidential informants for quality and not quantity. At the present time, due to the National Defense Program now in progress, an agent may be able to develop confidential informants through patriotism and loyalty to the Government, but this requires a great deal of investigation concerning the prospective informant's personal history, his position in the community, and whether or not he will be in a position to furnish information of value.

The line of demarcation between a National Defense Informant and a National Defense Source of Information is narrow, and these people should be carried as sources of information and not as informants until they have demonstrated their ability to produce information of value and are willing to continue to work and produce this information. It oftentimes requires months of contacting and developing a friendship to produce an informant of value, and after he has become an informant for the office, many times it is impossible for any one to contact this man except the agent who has developed the informant.

Respectfully submitted,

G. H. ERWIN
Special Agent

DEC 22 1941

66-2542-3-54
CHANGED TO
100-38083

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842pm Dime/KC

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Post Office Box 1850
Atlanta, Georgia
July 18, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Miss Gandy

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

RE: NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

Please be advised that [redacted] who is now a [redacted] will be glad to furnish any information concerning National Defense Matters to the Bureau.

[redacted] has been employed [redacted] for the last seven years in [redacted] and he has lived in [redacted] for the last [redacted] years. Prior to his being employed as [redacted] he attended [redacted]. He has spent one year in the Army as a [redacted] and has no criminal record.

[redacted] has a good reputation in the community, is single and lives [redacted]. He is an ardent supporter of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and it is believed that his information will be reliable and it is further believed that [redacted] is a man of integrity, since investigation at the Police Department has revealed this to be true.

It is requested that the Bureau check its files to determine whether or not he has a criminal record elsewhere.

[redacted] will be known in the Atlanta files as Confidential Informant [redacted].

Very truly yours,

F. R. HAMMACK

Special Agent in Charge

LDC:CN

RECORDED

INDEXED

EX - 5

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-14-81 BY 2842 JmJ/mc/JC

66-25423-55
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
5 JUL 22 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
IDENT. UNIT OF JUSTICE
EVERETT

General Bureau of Investigation

U. S. Department of Justice
Detroit, Michigan
July 21, 1941

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

2m
Re: ⁰CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS in General Intelligence Work

Dear Sir:

With reference to your letter of June 11, 1941, there is set out herein a summary of experiences, observations, and suggestions submitted to me by all the Special Agents of this office, in connection with the above captioned matter. Some of these suggestions apply particularly to the development of National Defense Informants, and are set out at the end of this letter.

Establish the fact that the Informant is in a position to obtain the information desired by the Bureau, and such will not be merely guesswork on his part.

Determine to your own satisfaction that he is willing to assist the Bureau and to cooperate by giving such information as comes to his attention.

Thoroughly acquaint him with the information desired by the Bureau, and have no doubt in your mind that he understands what information is desired.

Arrange for a ready and simple transmission of the information to the Bureau. Do not set up a complicated system, but some manner which would be agreeable to both the Agent and the Informant.

Have some knowledge of the background of the Informant. Get as much information as possible from the person who originally recommends that he be contacted, so that an intelligent interview can be conducted.

Determine his loyalty to the country, if possible; and if his motive for giving information is other than a patriotic one, attempt to ascertain just what the motive is.

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U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
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JUL 23 1941

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DATE 5-22-81 BY 284 p m m e c m

EX-18

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66-2542-2-69

Letter to the Director
dated July 21, 1941

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

Establish cordial relations with the informant. Be friendly and courteous toward him. Talk about subjects of mutual interest, and take a personal interest in him.

Continue to maintain frequent, regular contact with the informant; don't contact him just once and forget about him.

When it is believed a particular contact is of no value, eliminate his name from the lists of those to be contacted. No time should be wasted on those who cannot furnish information of value to the Bureau.

Don't accept as a fact every bit of information given to the Bureau by an Informant without making an effort to ascertain its true value.

Always contact the informant when he is alone, if at all possible; contacting in the presence of others tends to have him withhold some of the information. Consider the advisability of contacting him in the Bureau Field Office. This usually has a psychological effect on him, and will probably tend to cause him to furnish more complete and accurate information.

If a telephone contact is made, such as an appointment, before a personal contact, be sure the informant is not frightened by the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation wants to talk to him.

Advise the Informant that it is not necessary for him to make a trained investigator's report, but that you merely want a story of the happenings with which he is familiar. In this connection, he should be advised also that you, of course, want as many basic facts as possible.

When a potential Informant is interviewed, the interviewing Agent should submit a recommendation

Letter to the Director
dated July 21, 1941

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

as to his value, as he is in a better position to know his prospective value than anyone else.

Don't fail to make a record of the Informant in the office.

Don't fail to express appreciation, in some manner, for his assistance.

The following suggestions apply particularly to Plant and general National Defense Informants:

Always remember this type of Informant is usually a good citizen. Impress upon him the good he can do the country by furnishing such information to the Bureau. It is believed a better relationship can be developed by referring to them in their presence as "Contacts" instead of "Informants."

Impress them with the importance and the magnitude of the task, the responsibility that is upon them, and the value they can be to the Bureau in this work.

Impress upon them the peculiar knowledge they have of the plants, places of employment of other sources of information, which knowledge is not possessed by the agent.

Be sure they are familiar with the policy of the Bureau with reference to the labor situation, and employer-employee relations.

Inform them of the confidential nature of the program, and how they should keep it such; also, that any information furnished to this office will be kept in a confidential manner.

Tell them they should always protect themselves in the plant, so as not to put the plant or themselves in an embarrassing position.

Letter to the Director
dated July 21, 1941

Re: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

They should fully understand they are not Agents of the Bureau, and they will not receive badges, credentials, etc., nor can the Bureau assist them in obtaining special privileges within the plant.


Contact Informants previously interviewed for possible recommendations of other Informants in the plant. When this is done, don't rush the person recommending, but give him time to think over possible Informants, before submitting names to the Bureau.

To obtain names of possible Informants in a plant where there are no Informants listed, it is suggested that the police officer on the beat, the pastor of the community church, the proprietor of a nearby eating place, if he is known, those persons employed in the plant who have made complaints to the office and are listed in the indices of the office, be contacted.

An employee in a lesser capacity in the Personnel Department of the plant should be considered for a source of information.

Be sure the Informant understands that the Bureau desires to have all information, even those matters which to him appear to be most trivial. Request that he furnish the office with all such information, and let the office evaluate it; because although to him it might seem slight, and unimportant, to the office it might be some important connecting link in an extensive investigation.

Very truly yours,


John S. Bugas
Special Agent in Charge

JAC:BMB

mf

July 25, 1941

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED

66-2542-3-55

Mr. F. R. Hammack
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
501 Healey Building
Atlanta, Georgia

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 P.M. Jme/BC
ON 7.7.3.81

RE: NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

Receipt is acknowledged of your communication
dated July 18, 1941, regarding the following:



b7D

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) *Classified*
DATE *10/6/81*

In reply thereto, please be advised that from
the information furnished it has not been possible to
locate any record in the fingerprint files of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

DEC 22 1941

66-2542-3-51
CHANGED TO
100-38083

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DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 dmj/mc/SC

school professors and the like could possibly be in a position to ever have brought to their attention any information regarding criminal matters which they could impart to law enforcement officials. On the other hand, individuals with a criminal record or who are engaged in unlawful activities have been found to be willing to serve as informants, informers, or by any other appellation in the furnishing of information to law enforcement officials. This is undoubtedly possible because of the fact that such individuals in their unlawful activities come in contact with other individuals engaged in unlawful activities which unlawful activities in National Defense matters would include espionage, sabotage and subversive activities. For instance, it is believed that the National Maritime Union and several other labor unions, have been infiltrated by Communists and un-American individuals and it is also believed that they have in their employ numerous individuals with prior police records. Confidential National Defense Informants of the Bureau who enjoy an enviable reputation in the community and honesty and high standard of living would never possibly be in a position to gather information concerning such individuals in the National Maritime Union or other such organizations regarding Communist influences. It would only be possible for the Bureau to learn of such Communistic activities by securing informants within the National Maritime Union or other such organizations with such informants being among those who have past criminal records, because such disreputable persons will be confided in and will be approached more readily by Communists and foreign agents than would bank executives, ministers or even stevedores who have the reputation of being lawabiding and patriotic. One of the most serious problems facing us today is the infiltration of Communists and criminals into the labor groups. Strikes and slowdowns have occurred because of this. We have evidence that Communists use as their tools in subversion the substratum of society. Criminals know what other criminals are doing. Therefore, it must be assumed the criminals are better able to get information concerning such subversion and sabotage.

The objection that information, furnished by individuals with prior felony convictions, would be furnished to other Government agencies and that the Bureau would be embarrassed when it divulged the fact that such information was obtained from a felon could well be overcome by referring the information to the other Government agencies or Government officials with the statement that this information has been obtained from a confidential source of the Bureau who has previously been convicted of

a felony and with the warning that the information should be considered in the light of the individual's prior criminal activities.

The Bureau is charged with the responsibility and duty of investigating violations of the Espionage and Sabotage Statutes and also subversive activities, and during the present full emergency it is felt that the Bureau must take the necessary steps in order to cope with this responsibility and duty. It is believed that by the development and possible necessary payment of remuneration to individuals who belong to organizations, unions, etc. who have previously been convicted of felonies or who are now engaged in criminal activities, would be of tremendous material assistance to the Bureau in fulfilling its responsibilities in the National Defense program. Of course, the Bureau would not accept the information furnished by individuals on their face value as being accurate, but such information furnished by them would be weighed and considered in the light of the previous reputation and record of the individual. This could easily be accomplished by a notation on the 3x5 card maintained in the Chief Clerk's office on Confidential National Defense Informants reflecting that the informant has a prior felony conviction. It is the writer's opinion that if such individuals with prior records could be developed as informants, that it would cause a decided increase in the influx of important information into the Bureau regarding National Defense investigations.

As evidenced by the expression of Special Agents Inservice classes recently, the Field is somewhat upset and in a quandary in regard to the development of informants because of this Bureau policy, and, as evidenced by general remarks, it is felt that the Field upon learning that an individual has previously been convicted of a felony, immediately discontinues efforts to develop him as an informant of the Bureau because of this ruling.

In view of the writer's firmness in the opinion that the Bureau would not be embarrassed by the proper handling of Confidential National Defense Informants by the Field as well as the seat of Government and that no embarrassment will be experienced by the Bureau, and further in view of the fact that under the existing policy we have not established a proper coverage of productive informants, it is respectfully


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FOXWORTH

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
requested that consideration be given to the granting of authority for the Field to develop individuals, regardless of the fact whether they have prior felony convictions or not, as Confidential National Defense Informants.

If this recommendation is approved by you, a letter to all Special Agents in Charge will be prepared instructing that in all cases where the name of an individual is submitted as an informant who has a criminal record, the symbol "CR" must precede his symbol number designated for him in order that at all times it will be known that such informant does possess a criminal record. It is believed that this action should be taken in order to insure that there will be no confusion and to insure that at all times all Special Agents and officials of the Bureau will be cognizant of the fact that any information submitted, is submitted by an individual who possesses a criminal record.

Respectfully,



F. C. Holloman



JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
July 8, 1941

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth ✓
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Tele. Room _____
Your Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

PEF:ML

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The National Defense Conference, at which were present Messrs. Tolson, E. A. Tamm, Drayton, Rosen, Clegg, Gurnea and Foxworth, considered the attached suggestion of Mr. Holloman to the effect that the Bureau change its policy with respect to the development of confidential national defense informants so as to utilize those informants of value who have criminal records.

Realizing the possible embarrassment to the Bureau resulting from the use of confidential informants with criminal records without indicating to the persons receiving the information the fact that the informant did have a criminal record, it is recommended that in all cases where the name of an individual is submitted as an informant who has a criminal record, the symbol "CR" precede the symbol number designated for him, in order that it will be immediately apparent that the informant possesses a criminal record. On all information developed from such confidential informants which is referred to other Government agencies, the letter of referral would state that the information came from a confidential informant who had a prior criminal record.

There is attached hereto for your approval a letter to all SAC's outlining the Bureau's policy in this respect.

Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

Attachment

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DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 Ddh/mc/jc
7/19/90 SP5CJ/DMS 323,013

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66-2542-3-59
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
3 JUL 17 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TOLSON
TAMM

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CONF. INFO in Genl. Intelligence matters - Genl.

700 Tower Building
Jackson, Mississippi
July 23, 1941

74398

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS - *See Serial 1*

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the Bureau's communication addressed to all field offices, requesting that it be brought to the attention of all the special agents in the several field offices that the Bureau desires to be informed of any particular method or procedure used which would be unique in the making of confidential informants.

The Bureau's request has been brought to the attention of the special agents in this office. Special Agent John D. Sullivan has informed me by memorandum that he has never entered into any particular procedure in the developing of confidential informants, believing this to be of such a unique nature that a different approach is needed in almost every case. He has pointed out that there are a few things that are of a general nature that one usually does in each case in the development of confidential informants; namely, before developing any informant, the necessity for an informant must be shown; look for a man who will fit into that particular place from which information is desired; upon finding the man, obtain as much background information on him as possible, so that upon contacting him the conversation will be based on a common interest with him; and, after meeting a prospective informant on a common footing and securing his confidence, approach him on serving in the capacity of a confidential informant.

I believe that Special Agent Sullivan's remarks are especially well taken, and I am, therefore, submitting them to the Bureau for information purposes.

Very truly yours,

RECORDED

PERCY WYLY, II
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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DATE 2-22-81 BY 2842 Pm/mc/bc

July 15, 1941

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DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmo

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
TAMM, E. A.
CLEGG
FOXWORTH
GLAVIN
LADD
NICHOLS
CARSON

COFFEY
DRAYTON
EGAN
HARBO
HENDON
HINCE
HOLLOMAN
KIMBALL
KRAMER

LAUGHLIN, R. H. mc/JC
MURPHY
PATTERSON
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROSEN
TAMM, Q.
TRACY

Re: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

In view of the extreme emergency and the definite responsibility of the Bureau in the investigation of espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and other national defense matters, the matter of the development of productive informants, so located in organizations, etc., that they are in a position to furnish information to the Bureau regarding matters over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction, is deemed of the utmost urgency. In view of the responsibility of each Special Agent in Charge to be fully apprised at all times of any matters in his field office district, every reasonable step should be taken in order that real informants might be established.


In the past the Bureau's policy has been that no individual who has been convicted of a felony might be considered as a confidential informant in regard to national defense matters. In the interest of furthering the efficiency of the Bureau, this restriction is being removed. However, in each instance it shall be imperative that background information be secured regarding each confidential national defense informant, and particularly that the fact that such informant has a criminal record be definitely established. The Bureau should be appropriately advised of the criminal record of any individual whom a Field Office proposes to utilize, and, in designating the symbol number of such informant having a criminal record, it will be necessary that the letters "CR" immediately precede the usual symbol number which would ordinarily be given to a confidential national defense informant. In this manner, the Bureau, upon the receipt of any information from a Field Office which was furnished by an informant who possesses a criminal record, would be put on notice that

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such individual has a criminal record and the reliability of the information might be considered accordingly. In the event that it is deemed advisable at any time to transmit to any other government agency information furnished by an informant who has a criminal record, it will be necessary that the government agency be advised that the information was obtained from a confidential informant who possesses a police record and that such information should be considered by the agency in the light of that fact.

With the exception of the restriction that no individual who has been convicted of a felony might be considered as a confidential national defense informant, the instructions contained in Bureau Bulletin No. 17, First Series 1941, dated May 15, 1941, are to be strictly adhered to.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. E. Hoover". The signature is stylized, with a large, looped initial "J" and a cursive "E".

John Edgar Hoover
Director

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RECORDED 572 - July 15, 1941 3 - 59 DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/1

SAC ALBANY	DETROIT	MEMPHIS	RICHMOND
ATLANTA	EL PASO	MIAMI	ST. LOUIS
BALTIMORE	GRAND RAPIDS	MILWAUKEE	ST. PAUL
BIRMINGHAM	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
BOSTON	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
BUFFALO	HUNTINGTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
BUTTE	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
CHARLOTTE	JACKSON	NEW YORK (E.J. Connelley)	SAN JUAN
CHICAGO	JUNEAU	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
CINCINNATI	KANSAS CITY	OMAHA	SEATTLE
CLEVELAND	KNOXVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SIOUX FALLS
DALLAS	LITTLE ROCK	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
DENVER	LOS ANGELES	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
DES MOINES	LOUISVILLE	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

Re: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

Dear Sir:

In view of the extreme emergency and the definite responsibility of the Bureau in the investigation of espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and other national defense matters, the matter of the development of productive informants, so located in organizations, etc., that they are in a position to furnish information to the Bureau regarding matters over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction, is deemed of the utmost urgency. In view of the responsibility of each Special Agent in Charge to be fully apprised at all times of any matters in his field office district, every reasonable step should be taken in order that real informants might be established.

In the past the Bureau's policy has been that no individual who has been convicted of a felony might be considered as a confidential informant in regard to national defense matters. In the interest of furthering the efficiency of the Bureau, this restriction is being removed. However, in each instance it shall be imperative that background information be secured regarding each confidential national defense informant, and particularly that the fact that such informant has a criminal record be definitely established. The Bureau should be appropriately advised of the criminal record of any individual whom a Field Office proposes to utilize, and, in designating the symbol number of such informant having a criminal record, it will be necessary that the letters "CR" immediately precede the usual symbol number which would ordinarily be given to a confidential national defense informant. In this manner, the Bureau, upon the receipt of any information from a Field Office which was furnished by an informant who possesses a criminal record, would be put on notice that

such individual has a criminal record and the reliability of the information might be considered accordingly. In the event that it is deemed advisable at any time to transmit to any other government agency information furnished by an informant who has a criminal record, it will be necessary that the government agency be advised that the information was obtained from a confidential informant who possesses a police record and that such information should be considered by the agency in the light of that fact.

With the exception of the restriction that no individual who has been convicted of a felony might be considered as a confidential national defense informant, the instructions contained in Bureau Bulletin No. 17, First Series 1941, dated May 15, 1941, are to be strictly adhered to.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director



RHC:AIM

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

July 3, 1941

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmd

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. P.E. FOXWORTH

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

On July 1, 1941

[redacted] was referred to the Plant Survey Section by the Director's office. It appears that [redacted] had just completed a tour of the Bureau and had expressed a desire to become a confidential informant in national defense matters.

[redacted] was interviewed by the writer and stated that he has for some time worked in connection with shipbuilding and that he recently applied for a position at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Newport News, Virginia. In connection with his application for employment, he was afforded a physical examination by a Dr. Longacre who was employed by the Dry Dock Company. Mr. Deck advised further that his application was turned down because the physical examination revealed that he had a slight hernia. He protested against this finding and inferred that in his opinion he was not employed because of "politics" within the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company. He stated that he felt that he would make a valuable confidential informant for this Bureau with regard to any matters transpiring at the shipyard. However, in order for him to get employment so that he could be of service to this Bureau, it would be necessary that the Bureau use its influence to have the company or Dr. Longacre rescind the original findings. He requested that the Bureau write a letter to the company so that he might secure the job.

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RECORDED

The writer advised [redacted] that this would be impossible and pointed out to him further that even if it were possible his value as an informant would be nullified were this Bureau to take an active interest in securing his employment, since this fact would become known throughout the shipyard. [redacted] apparently thought of this and agreed that that would more or less obviate the possibility of this Bureau's acting on his behalf. [redacted] was requested to communicate with the Richmond Office in the event that he receives employment at the Newport News Shipyard or any other shipyard. This he promised to do.

Respectfully,

R. H. Cunningham
R. H. Cunningham

CH-28

132

July 11, 1941

JTM:hmg

66-2542-3 ~~46~~

Special Agent in Charge
Newark, New Jersey

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmd/mc/JC

Dear Sir:

It has been called to my attention through Special Agent John F. Murphy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C., that [redacted]

has information concerning the possible development of confidential informants among the deaf and dumb people.



It is desired that an Agent interview [redacted] in order to obtain from her any information she might have concerning the names and locations of various clubs organized and maintained by these deaf and dumb people. The purpose of obtaining this information is to determine the possibility of developing confidential informants among the deaf and dumb people in their various activities.

The Bureau wishes to be advised of the results of your interview with [redacted]

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 18, 1941

74392

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JTM:hmg

DECLASSIFIED BY *sp. 6 bja/bjs*
ON *6-6-94*

THE DIRECTOR

There is herein set forth a list of confidential national defense informants who can be considered as key informants in the particular Field Divisions wherein they are situated.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

[Redacted] (c)

This informant, on July 14, 1941, was granted authority to proceed to New York [Redacted] and the Special Agent in Charge in New York was told that the Bureau was willing to furnish [Redacted] for this project if necessary. She was accompanied by [Redacted] who was to try to secure a position [Redacted] in New York, furnishing information to the New York Field Office concerning them. *(c)*

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY *2842pm JMC JC*
REASON FOR EXTENSION *2/3*
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION *2-14-91*
7-14-81

RECORDED

CONF. INTE.
Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

[Redacted] *(c)*
This informant was authorized on July 1, 1941 to receive [Redacted] per month for a period of three months. He has furnished information regarding Communist activities in the South and has established contact with Communist Party of the United States [Redacted] He, himself, is not a member of the Communist Party. *(c)*

66-2542-3-13
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JUL 21 1941
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Page 2



He has been authorized to receive [redacted] per month for a period of three months and has furnished the Albany Field Office with information concerning Communist activities in and around Albany, attending Communist Party meetings, although not a member.



This informant was employed [redacted] and furnished complete information concerning the officials therein to the Boston Field Office. She is being paid on a C.O.D. basis until her field of activity increases concerning Italian activities in Massachusetts. She is not a member of any Italian organization.



This informant is being paid [redacted] per month, having made a survey of the Communist Party in Montana, and is going to make a similar survey of the Party in Idaho. Although at one time he was a member of the Communist Party, he is no longer associated with it.



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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Page 3

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This informant is being paid [redacted] per month, having been authorized June 4, 1941; works [redacted] She merely works for this organization and is not a member.

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[redacted]

Has been paid [redacted] per week and is [redacted] the Chicago Field Office. [redacted] furnishing information to [redacted]

[redacted]

She has been accepted as a member of the [redacted] She furnishes information concerning the activities of these organizations to the Chicago Field Office.

[redacted]

Is a general informant on Communist activities for the Cincinnati Field Office and is being paid [redacted] per month. At the present time he is not a member of the Communist Party.

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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

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Page 4

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[redacted] ✓
Furnishes general Communist information to the Cleveland Field Office and is being paid [redacted] per week for two months; authorized June 10, 1941. He is not a member of the Party.

[redacted] ✓ (u)
Was authorized June 25, 1941 to be paid [redacted] per month for a period of three months, furnishing the Detroit Field Office with information regarding Communists in this district, he, himself, not being a member of the Party.

[redacted] ✓
Works [redacted] in Detroit and turns over all information concerning Communists who work [redacted] to the Detroit Field Office. Was authorized on July 1, 1941 to be paid [redacted] per month for 90 days, and he is not a member of the organization. ✓

[redacted] ✓
Was authorized on April 24, 1941, to be paid on a C.O.D. basis; has submitted information to the Detroit Field Office regarding pro-Nazi members of the GBU, including names, addresses, occupations, descriptions and pertinent statements made concerning their sympathies. He has close association but no membership in any German organization.

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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Page 5

[REDACTED]

Has furnished valuable information concerning the German situation in Honolulu and was authorized on June 19, 1941, to be paid [REDACTED] per month for a period of 90 days. He is employed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Does not belong to the Bund or any German club.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has been informing the Honolulu Field Office of Japanese activities taking place in Honolulu; was authorized on April 14, 1941, to be paid [REDACTED] per month. Does not belong to any of the Japanese societies.

[REDACTED]

This informant has been developing information relative to infiltration of Communists into the [REDACTED] and possibly other [REDACTED] was a member of the Communist Party and is now establishing recontact; is being paid on a C.O.D. basis. (u)

[REDACTED]

Has possession of information regarding Communist activities in the Houston Field Division, and can obtain additional information from time to time

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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

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Page 6

through friends [redacted]
who are members of the Communist Party. According to the Houston Field Office he is producing excellently and is being paid \$3.50 per day, not to exceed [redacted] per month.

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[redacted] (u)
Was authorized July 2, 1941, to be paid [redacted] per week for a period of 60 days; has accomplished considerable for the Indianapolis Field Office in connection with Communist activities in the Calumet region, and was asked by the Communist Party to attend the Communist school to be held in Chicago. (u)

[redacted] (u)
On May 20, 1941, he was authorized to receive [redacted] per week for a period of 60 days. He furnishes general information concerning Communists to the Kansas City Field Office.

[redacted]
Is furnishing the Los Angeles Field Office with information concerning the Japanese situation in that area and is being paid [redacted] per week for a period of two months since June 23, 1941. Has no association through membership in any Japanese clubs.

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
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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Page 7




Is furnishing information regarding German activities in the Los Angeles Field Division and was authorized on May 14, 1941, to be paid [redacted] per week for a period of 60 days. This informant has associated with individuals connected with the [redacted]



He is a member of the Communist Party and is being paid by the Bureau the sum of [redacted] per month. *CU*



Was authorized on July 16, 1941, to be paid [redacted] per month for a period of three months. He is a member of the Communist Party and is closely associated with [redacted]



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Page 8

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

[REDACTED] (U)

He is a member of the Communist Party of Louisville and is paid [REDACTED] per month for a period of three months, being authorized June 17, 1941.

[REDACTED] (U)

Was authorized on June 17, 1941, to receive [REDACTED] per month for a period of three months. He furnishes the New Orleans Field Office with information regarding Nazi, Italian and Spanish activities in that district, through association with members of the various clubs. He, himself, is not a member.

[REDACTED] (U)

On May 13, 1941, she was authorized to receive [REDACTED] per week for a period of 90 days and on July 9, 1941, [REDACTED] a week was added to that amount. She is [REDACTED] (U)

[REDACTED] (U)

He is a member of the Communist Party and authorization was given on February 25, 1941 to pay him [REDACTED] a day for 60 days.

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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Page 9




Furnishes the New York City Field Office with information concerning persons who are pro-Nazi in that district. It is possible that he was, or will be, drafted into the Army. (u)



Has been authorized to receive [] per week and furnishes continuous information regarding German activities in New York City and vicinity, but does not belong to any of the organizations (u)



Was authorized on June 25, 1941, to receive [] per month for a period of 90 days. He is one of the most productive informants in the Bureau, securing valuable information concerning the Italian secret agents in the United States. (u)



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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Page 10

This informant gives very good information concerning various peace organizations, including American Peace Mobilization. He was authorized on May 3, 1941, to receive [redacted] a day for a period of 90 days. He is a member of the above-named organization. (u)

[redacted]

Are receiving [redacted] per week for six months, having been authorized on May 21, 1941. [redacted] is extremely embittered against Germany due to [redacted]

[redacted] and will contact German groups to which she belonged, forwarding any information she might secure to the Philadelphia Field Office. Her husband will aid her in her work.

[redacted]

On June 23, 1941, he was authorized to receive [redacted] per week for a period of 10 weeks. He is [redacted]

[redacted] He is furnishing the Philadelphia Field Office with information concerning Italian activities in that district. (u)

[redacted]

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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Page 11

He is receiving [] per week for a period of 90 days, having been authorized on May 22, 1941, by the Pittsburgh Field Office. He is furnishing information concerning the Communist Party and at the present time is attempting to join that organization. (u)

[]

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Was authorized on May 15, 1941, to receive [] per week for 12 weeks. He is active in securing information of value pertaining to Nazi activities, their organizations and other relating matters; is presently working on the Sonntagsbote, a German language newspaper, in the advertising department.

[]

Is furnishing the Pittsburgh Office with information regarding persons of pro-Nazi tendencies; was authorized on June 19, 1941, to receive [] per month for a period of 60 days. He does not belong to any of the Nazi organizations. (u)

[]

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Was authorized to receive [] per month for information concerning the Pittsburgh Youth Council. []

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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Page 12

[REDACTED] (u)

He is a member of the Workers Alliance and the Communist Party of Oregon. He is paid [REDACTED] per week, plus [REDACTED] per week expenses, for three months, having been authorized July 18, 1941.

[REDACTED] (u)

On June 25, 1941, was authorized to receive [REDACTED] per week for three months. He works chiefly on un-American activities around San Antonio, particularly concerning Communists. His activities do not include membership in any un-American organizations. (u)

[REDACTED]

Is paid [REDACTED] per month for his general undercover work, but particularly with regard to German activities. He also does not belong to any of the Nazi clubs. (u)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and furnishes the San Antonio Field Office with information concerning Nazi activities in that district. On July 9, 1941, was authorized to receive [REDACTED] per week for a period of 90 days. He receives his information from members of the Bund and other German societies.

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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Page 13



(u)

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Is a member of the Communist Party in San Francisco and furnishes an account of their activities to the San Francisco Field Office.

(u)



(u)

He is employed



having been authorized March 24, 1941. is receiving per month,

(u)



(u)

Is receiving per month for the information he furnishes concerning Nazi activities in that district. He does not belong to any of the clubs.

(u)



(u)

Was authorized on May 24, 1941, to receive per month for three months for the information he was furnishing concerning Italian activities in San Francisco, although not belonging to any of the Fascist societies.

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(u)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Page 14

[REDACTED]

Is being paid [REDACTED] per month, plus [REDACTED] expenses, by the San Francisco Field Office. She has gained the confidence of several prominent Nazis in San Francisco and speaks fluent German and Italian, and is also acquainted with prominent Fascists and Communists. (u)

[REDACTED]

Was authorized on April 11, 1941, to receive [REDACTED] per month for his information concerning the Communist Party, of which he is a member. (u)

[REDACTED]

This informant speaks German, Danish, Norwegian and English fluently and reads Swedish; furnishes the San Francisco Field Office with information concerning Communists and Nazis, but does not belong to any organizations. (u)

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Page 19
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Was authorized on June 10, 1941, to receive [] per month for the information he was furnishing on Japanese activities in California. He is connected with [] receiving most of his information through [] (u)

[]

Was authorized to receive, on July 1, 1941, [] per month for a period of three months for his information on Japanese activities in the San Francisco Field District; even though he does not belong to any of their societies (u)

[]

Furnishes the Seattle Field Office with information concerning Japanese activities, and was authorized on May 20, 1941, to receive [] per month for a period of three months. This man is []

[]

The Washington Field Office was authorized by Mr. Drayton to pay this informant \$10.00 per day, and he was given [] in cash to cover expenses and salary prior to leaving for Chicago on April 11, 1941. He is []

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Page 16

[redacted] He also has numerous contacts with the German-American Fund. This informant is returning to [redacted] in the near future and his services will be terminated.

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Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

WAT:LN

July 20, 1941

74396

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 P.D. MC-JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FORM 11, 1-1-41
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-14-91
7-14-81

THE DIRECTOR

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 EJA/SP6
ON 4-22-91
83-1343

In connection with the attached memorandum summarizing the informant coverage of the various field offices, I desire to point out that although the Chicago Division is indicated as not having a Japanese informant, it was, in fact, the Chicago Office which developed [redacted] who is credited as an informant of the New York Office. You will recall that this is the Japanese girl who formerly worked for us in the Chicago district but for whom appropriate arrangements have been made to work in the New York district because of the probability of her being able to produce better information there.

The Washington Field Office is credited with having as an informant on German activities [redacted] As a matter of fact, he literally fell into our laps and it is no credit to the Washington Field Office that he has proved to be a valuable informant.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Respectfully,

E. A. Tamm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 P.D. MC-JC

RECORDED
INDEXED
JUL 2 1941
FBI

Original cannot be located and is not on record. When original is received in Files Division it will be filed either with this copy or may be given a new serial.
7/28/41
ENC. 9

66-2542-3-64
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 JUL 31 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

RFC:WGR

July 19, 1941

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 DmyC

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-6 LJA/PJP
ON 4-22-94
83-1343

THE DIRECTOR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Attached hereto is a memorandum containing a Bureau analysis of the really productive, worthwhile confidential national defense informants throughout the Field. It will be noted that there are a total of 33 informants falling within this category. By way of recapitulation there is set out for your convenience and information hereinafter, a tabulation of these informants, together with their names by Field Office, listed as to the type of information being furnished by them. Additional background and personal information concerning each informant mentioned is set forth in the attached memorandum.

ALBANY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

ATLANTA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

BALTIMORE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

BIRMINGHAM FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

BOSTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Foxworth
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Drayton
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Tracy
- Miss Gandy

CLASSIFIED AND
RECOMMENDED BY SP-6 LJA/PJP
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, I, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

RECORDED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1 JUL 31 1941

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED

b7D

BUFFALO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DETROIT FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

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CHARLOTTE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

CHICAGO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 1
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

CINCINNATI FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

(u)

~~C~~CLEVELAND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

DALLAS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson

Mr. E. A. Tamm

Mr. Clegg

Mr. Foxworth

Mr. Glavin

Mr. Ladd

Mr. Nichols

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Carson

Mr. Drayton

Mr. Quinn Tamm

Mr. Hendon

Mr. Tracy

Miss Gandy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DENVER FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

DES MOINES FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

DETROIT FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2
 German activities: 1
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

EL PASO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

GRAND RAPIDS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

HONOLULU FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 1
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 1

HOUSTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

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 11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Foxworth _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Drayton _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Miss Gandy _____


MURKINSON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INDIANAPOLIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 12
 German activities: 1
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0



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JACKSON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

JURMAN FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

(u)
 C

KANSAS CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0



KNOXVILLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

LITTLE ROCK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LOS ANGELES FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 1
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 1

LOUISVILLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

MEMPHIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

MIAMI FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

MILWAUKEE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

NEWARK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

NEW HAVEN FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

NEW ORLEANS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(u)
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Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Foxworth _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Drayton _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Miss Gandy _____

NEW ORLEANS FIELD DIVISION (Continued)

Informants on German activities: 1
 (This individual also furnishes information on Italian activities)
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 3
 German activities: 4
 Italian activities: 1
 Japanese activities: 1

OKLAHOMA CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

OMAHA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

PHILADELPHIA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 1
 Japanese activities: 0

PROBET FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Foxworth _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Drayton _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Miss Gandy _____

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PITTSBURGH FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2

German activities: 2

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

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PORTLAND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

RICHMOND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

SAINT LOUIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

W
ESAINT PAUL FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

SALT LAKE CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

SAN ANTONIO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1

German activities: 2

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Foxworth _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Drayton _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Miss Gandy _____

SAN DIEGO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAN FRANCISCO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 4

German activities: 2

Italian activities: 1
 Japanese activities: 2



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SAN JUAN FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0


(W)
 E

SAVANNAH FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

SEATTLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 1



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STONE FALLS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Foxworth _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Drayton _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Miss Gandy _____

Memorandum for the Director

- 9 -

SPRINGFIELD FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

WASHINGTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(u)
L

b7D

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-159

FJS:PF

66-2542-3

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

JULY 22, 1941

32128

Transmit the following message to:

ALBANY, ATLANTA, BALTIMORE, BIRMINGHAM,
BOSTON, BUFFALO, BUTTE, CHARLOTTE, CHICAGO,
DENVER, DES MOINES, DETROIT, GRAND RAPIDS,
HONOLULU, HOUSTON, HUNTINGTON, INDIANAPOLIS,
JACKSON, JUNEAU, KANSAS CITY, LITTLE ROCK,
LOS ANGELES, MEMPHIS, MIAMI, NEWARK, NEW ORLEANS,
NEW YORK, PHILADELPHIA, PHOENIX, PITTSBURGH,
PORTLAND, RICHMOND, ST. PAUL, SALT LAKE CITY,
SAN ANTONIO, SAN FRANCISCO, SIOUX FALLS, SPRINGFIELD

RELET DATED JUNE ELEVEN, FORTYONE, CONCERNING EXPERIENCES OF AGENTS IN
DEVELOPING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. IMPERATIVE THIS INFORMATION BE SUBMITTED
BY AUGUST TWENTYEIGHT.

HOOVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2542 DMC
mc/TC

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 22 1941

NAVAL RADIO

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 22 1941

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R 582 JUL 25 1961

SENT VIA

Entered in Director's Office

RECORDED

Per

S:PF

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

JULY 21, 1941

Transmit the following message to:

BALTIMORE, CLEVELAND, DENVER, HONOLULU,
HOUSTON, JACKSON, JUNEAU, KNOXVILLE,
LOUISVILLE, MILWAUKEE, NEWARK, NEW HAVEN,
OKLAHOMA CITY, OMAHA, SAN DIEGO, SAN FRANCISCO
SPRINGFIELD, WASHINGTON (BY MAIL)

RELET DATED JULY TWO, FORTYONE, CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS.
IMPERATIVE SUBMIT DATA AMSD TOMORROW.

HOOVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842
pmu/mc/jc

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 21 1941
NAVAL RADIO

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66-7542-3-66
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
7 JUL 24 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
7/25

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Foxworth
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Drayton
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Tracy
- Miss Gandy

SENT VIA

M

Per

66-2542-3-617
CHANGED TO
100-38083

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DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmj/mc/c

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



EAT:LN

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

July 20, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

In connection with the attached memorandum summarizing the informant coverage of the various field offices, I desire to point out that although the Chicago Division is indicated as not having a Japanese informant, it was, in fact, the Chicago Office which developed [redacted] who is credited as an informant of the New York Office. You will recall that this is the Japanese girl who formerly worked for us in the Chicago district but for whom appropriate arrangements have been made to work in the New York district because of the probabilities of her being able to produce better information there. (u)

The Washington Field Office is credited with having as an informant on German activities [redacted]. As a matter of fact, he literally fell into our laps and it is no credit to the Washington Field Office that he has proved to be a valuable informant.

Respectfully,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmd

CLASSIFIED AND
2842 pmd me
TENSION
E. A. Tamm
DIRECTOR
DECLASSIFICATION 2-13-81
7-13-81

RECORDED

INDEXED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY 846 LJA/plp
ON 4-22-91
83-1343

66-2542-3-68
4 AUG 8 1941
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Tele. Room _____
Your Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Goshaw _____
Miss Gandy _____

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1 ENCL. PM

ENCLOSURE
THREE
CONFIDENTIAL

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

July 18, 1941

JTM:hmg

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CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 8842 PmJ/mce-JV
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 2/3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-14-91
7-14-81

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

There is herein set forth a list of confidential national defense informants who can be considered as key informants in the particular Field Divisions wherein they are situated.

[Redacted]

This informant, on July 14, 1941, was granted authority to proceed to New York to [Redacted] and the Special Agent in Charge in New York was told that the Bureau was willing to furnish [Redacted] for this project if necessary. She was accompanied by [Redacted] who was to try to secure a position [Redacted] in New York, furnishing information to the New York Field Office concerning them. (u)

RECORDED

[Redacted]

This informant was authorized on July 1, 1941 to receive [Redacted] per month for a period of three months. He has furnished information regarding Communistic activities in the South and has established contact with [Redacted]

[Redacted] He, himself, is not a member of the Communist Party. (u)

66-2542 3.14

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Tele. Room _____
Tour Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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66-2542-3-68
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
4 AUG 7 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FIVE THREE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Post Office Box 812
Chicago, Illinois

August 2, 1941

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmj

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the Bureau letter dated July 19, 1941 advising that MR. JOHN MANNING, a former Special Agent now employed by Socony-Vacuum Oil Company at New York, stated that the Bureau apparently has a confidential informant in the [redacted] region named [redacted] inasmuch as this person had come to the Standard Oil Company refinery at Chicago in August, 1940, to request information concerning persons named [redacted]. It is further mentioned in reference letter that MR. MANNING stated that this [redacted] is very friendly with [redacted] and further that [redacted] had requested the information for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The reference Bureau letter advises that the Bureau files failed to reveal information concerning [redacted] being a confidential informant of the Chicago office. The Bureau requested in its letter that the Chicago office conduct appropriate inquiries concerning [redacted] to determine the truth of these statements and to ascertain whether or not he is using the name of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to gain information for his own personal use, and that the Bureau be advised immediately as to the results of this investigation.

A check of the indices of this office failed to reflect any information concerning [redacted]. However, attention is directed to the RUC report of Special Agent W. E. ASSMUS (A) dated at Chicago, Illinois, June 11, 1941 in the case entitled [redacted] INTERNAL SECURITY - C which contains information to the effect that the subject resides at [redacted] and is employed by the [redacted].

It is possible that the subject of the latter file may be the [redacted] referred to on the Bureau letter. It is noted that the Indianapolis office

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EX - 4

Letter to the Director
August 2, 1941

was made office or origin in this case and that office may possibly possess further information at this time.

The check of the local telephone directory reflected that the [redacted] is located at [redacted]. It is also noted from the telephone directory that the [redacted] maintains [redacted].

b7D

From the above it appears quite probable that [redacted] may possibly be an informant of the Indianapolis Field Division and that office is requested to conduct the investigation requested by the Bureau in the reference letter.

Very truly yours,


W. S. DEVEREAUX
Special Agent in Charge

SED:RBH

cc - 2 Indianapolis

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DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pmj/mc/c

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66-2542-3-9-41

CH-18

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*Supers rec'd & changed
to CH-18*



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

RPC:WGR
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EXTENDED BY AD-100
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-91
9-15-81

July 19, 1944
DECLASSIFIED ON 4-22-83
83-1343

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OTHERWISE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Attached hereto is a memorandum containing a Bureau analysis of the really productive, worthwhile confidential national defense informants throughout the Field. It will be noted that there are a total of 53 informants falling within this category. By way of recapitulation there is set out for your convenience and information hereinafter, a tabulation of these informants, together with their names by Field Office, listed as to the type of information being furnished by them. Additional background and personal information concerning each informant mentioned is set forth in the attached memorandum.

ALBANY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

ATLANTA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: X-2
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

BALTIMORE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

BIRMINGHAM FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

BOSTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 1
Japanese activities: 0

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DATE 2-13-81 BY 2802 PMJ
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1. AUG 29 '91
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
TOLSON
TAMM
CONFIDENTIAL

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BUFFALO FIELD DIVISION

2

Informants on Communist activities:	81	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

BUTTE FIELD DIVISION

✓

Informants on Communist activities:	1	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

CHARLOTTE FIELD DIVISION

2

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

CHICAGO FIELD DIVISION

✓

Informants on Communist activities:	1	
German activities:	1	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

CINCINNATI FIELD DIVISION

2

Informants on Communist activities:	1	
German activities:	01	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

CLEVELAND FIELD DIVISION

2

Informants on Communist activities:	1	
German activities:	01	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

DALLAS FIELD DIVISION

0

Informants on Communist activities:	1	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DENVER FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

DES MOINES FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

DETROIT FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2
 German activities: 1
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

EL PASO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

GRAND RAPIDS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

HONOLULU FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 1
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 1

HOUSTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

CONFIDENTIAL

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HUNTINGTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

INDIANAPOLIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0



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JACKSON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

JUNEAU FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

KANSAS CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0



KNOXVILLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

LITTLE ROCK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LOS ANGELES FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 1
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 1

CONFIDENTIAL

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LOUISVILLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

MEMPHIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

MIAMI FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 02
 German activities: 01
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

MILWAUKEE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 01
 German activities: 01
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

NEWARK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

NEW HAVEN FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

NEW ORLEANS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1

CONFIDENTIAL

PITTSBURGH FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2

German activities: 2

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

PORTLAND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

RICHMOND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

SAINT LOUIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

SAINT PAUL FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

SALT LAKE CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

SAN ANTONIO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1

German activities: 2

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

CONFIDENTIAL

b7D

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW ORLEANS FIELD DIVISION (Continued)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Informants on German activities: 1

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 3

German activities: 4

Italian activities: 1

Japanese activities: 1

b7D

OKLAHOMA CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

OMAHA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

PHILADELPHIA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 1

Japanese activities: 0

PHOENIX FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0

German activities: 0

Italian activities: 0

Japanese activities: 0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAN DIEGO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

CONFIDENTIAL

SAN FRANCISCO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 4

German activities: 2

Italian activities: 1
Japanese activities: 2

b7D

SAN JUAN FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SAVANNAH FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SEATTLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 1

SIOUX FALLS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum for the Director

- 9 -

SPRINGFIELD FIELD DIVISION


Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

WASHINGTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0



Respectfully,


P. E. Foxworth

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

JTM:wmc

August 8, 1941

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Tele. Room _____
Tour Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

DECLASSIFIED BY *8pk/ajc/ljp*
ON *4-28-99*
83-1343

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

There is attached hereto a memorandum containing the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed in each Field Office, who are members of the Communist Party, the German-American Bund, or any of the other front organizations whose activities are known to be inimical to the welfare of the Government. Included in these numbers are many Informants who are considered key Informants of their respective offices.

It will be noted that the total number of all such Informants is 227. *QW*

Respectfully,

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OTHERWISE

P. E. Foxworth

Attachment

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH
FOM, II, 1-2.4
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION *7-13-91*
7-13-91

EX-9 RECORDED

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cc- Nichols in connection
with Whitehead Book

BB4
12-29-58

ENCLOSURE
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66-2542-3-172
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 AUG 15 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FAMM
FOXWORTH

CH-18 COPIES DESTROYED
R 582 JUL 19 1961

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONF. INFT. in Genl. Inted. matters - genl. mal

DECLASSIFIED BY *8868ja/dlp*
ON *4-22-98* *83-1343*

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY *24mld*
REASON FOR EXTENSION *2*
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION *9-15-81*

MEMORANDUM

August 8, 1941

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE *7-13-81* BY *2842 dmd*
me/jc

There is herein set forth the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed in each Field Office who are members of the Communist Party, the German-American Bund, or any of the other front organizations whose activities are known to be inimical to the welfare of the Government.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

OTHER
NATIONALISTIC
ORGANIZATIONS

FIELD OFFICE	COMMUNIST PARTY	COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS	GERMAN	ITALIAN	JAPANESE	OTHER NATIONALISTIC ORGANIZATIONS
ALBANY	0	1	1	0	0	0
ATLANTA	1	1	0	0	0	0
BALTIMORE	1	0	1	0	0	0
BIRMINGHAM	0	0	0	1	0	0
BOSTON	1	7	2	1	0	1
BUFFALO	1	1	0	0	0	0
BUTTE	1	1	0	0	0	0
CHARLOTTE	1	0	0	0	0	0
CHICAGO	4	39	2	0	0	0
CINCINNATI	3	12	0	0	0	0
CLEVELAND	1	0	0	0	0	0
DALLAS	3	0	0	0	0	0
DENVER	1	0	0	0	0	0
DES MOINES	0	0	0	0	0	0
DETROIT	6	0	3	0	0	0
EL PASO	0	0	0	0	0	0

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R 582 JUL 25 1961

EX-9

CONFIDENTIAL

66-2542-3-72
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1 AUG 15 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>FIELD OFFICE</u>	<u>COMMUNIST PARTY</u>	<u>COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS</u>	<u>GERMAN</u>	<u>ITALIAN</u>	<u>JAPANESE</u>	<u>OTHER NATIONALISTIC ORGANIZATIONS</u>
GRAND RAPIDS	0	0	0	0	0	0
HONOLULU	0	0	0	0	0	0
HOUSTON	2	1	0	0	0	0
HUNTINGTON	0	5	0	2	0	0
INDIANAPOLIS	3	1	1	0	0	0
JACKSON	0	0	0	0	0	0
JUNEAU	0	0	0	0	0	0
KANSAS CITY	3	0	2	0	0	0
KNOXVILLE	0	0	0	0	0	0
LITTLE ROCK	0	0	0	0	0	0
LOS ANGELES	2	0	2	0	2	0
LOUISVILLE	2	0	0	0	0	0
MEMPHIS	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIAMI	3	1	3	0	0	0
MILWAUKEE	1	0	0	0	0	0
NEWARK	0	3	1	0	0	0
NEW HAVEN	3	0	2	1	0	0
NEW ORLEANS	2	0	0	0	0	0
NEW YORK	4	6	1	0	0	0
OKLAHOMA CITY	0	2	0	0	0	0
OMAHA	1	0	1	0	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>FIELD OFFICE</u>	<u>COMMUNIST PARTY</u>	<u>COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS</u>	<u>GERMAN</u>	<u>ITALIAN</u>	<u>JAPANESE</u>	<u>OTHER NATIONALISTIC ORGANIZATIONS</u>
PHILADELPHIA	3	0	1	1	0	0
PHOENIX	0	0	1	0	3	0
PITTSBURGH	1	1	2	0	0	0
PORTLAND	1	1	1	0	0	0
RICHMOND	0	0	0	0	0	0
SAINT LOUIS	4	0	0	0	0	0
SAINT PAUL	3	0	1	0	0	0
SALT LAKE CITY	0	0	0	0	0	0
SAN ANTONIO	2	0	0	0	0	0
SAN DIEGO	0	0	0	0	0	0
SAN FRANCISCO	2	0	1	3	0	0
SAN JUAN	0	0	0	0	0	2
SAVANNAH	8	0	8	9	0	0
SEATTLE	2	4	0	0	0	0
SIOUX FALLS	0	0	0	0	0	0
SPRINGFIELD	0	0	0	0	0	0
WASHINGTON, D. C.	0	1	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	<u>76</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>

GRAND TOTAL 227

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO
OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

Mr. Tolson ☒
Mr. E. A. Tamm ☒
Mr. Clegg ☒
Mr. Foxworth ☒
Mr. Glavin ☒
Mr. Ladd ☒
Mr. Nichols ☒
Mr. Rosen ☒
Mr. Carson ☒
Mr. Quinn Tamm ☒
Mr. Tracy ☒
Miss Gandy ☒

I would like
to have this
revised to date.
many docs
clarified the
attached was

See Me ☐
Note and Return ☐
Remarks:

incorrect & some
insisted they had
had real informant for
some time when this showed
none.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 DHD/mc

JC



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

EAT:DS

August 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FOXWORTH

I have made arrangements for the obtaining of Communist and subversive information from several individuals. This information will come in a typewritten form with its source indicated by a numerical designation. It is not necessary to retype these memoranda or to destroy them as is done with some information from anonymous outside sources. The material can be filed in the Bureau files in the form in which it is received.

The informant designated as [redacted] is a member of [redacted].
[redacted] are members of [redacted].
[redacted] Informant No. [redacted] is active in [redacted].

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 P.M. Lme 150
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-13-91
7-13-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Very truly yours,

Edward A. Tamm

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 EJA/CLJ
ON 4-22-94
83-1343

CH-17
123

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

66-2542-3-73
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
8 AUG 23 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

CHC:CSH

August 27, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The Executives Conference, Messrs. E. A. Tamm, Nichols, Ladd, Tracy, Hince, Rosen, R. H. Laughlin, Holloman and Carson, being present, considered and unanimously approved for transmission to the field the attached bulletin with regard to confidential informants and the manner in which they are to be reported to the Bureau.

Respectfully,
For the Conference,

[Signature]
Clyde Tolson, Chairman

[Signature]
W. R. Glavin, Secretary

Mr. Tolson ☒
Mr. E. A. Tamm ☒
Mr. Clegg ☒
Mr. Glavin ☒
Mr. Ladd ☒
Mr. Nichols ☒
Mr. Rosen ☒
Mr. Carson ☒
Mr. Egan ☒
Mr. Gurnea ☒
Mr. Hendon ☒
Mr. Coffey ☒
Mr. Harbo ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Mr. Nease ☒
Mr. Tracy ☒
Miss Gandy ☒

[Signature]

*Approved for the Director
EW 8/27/41*

1 ENCL.

66-2542-3-74
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 SEP 17 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
THREE

66-2542-7551
RECORDED COPY FILED IN

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

RHC:MK

August 22, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FOXWORTH


There is transmitted herewith a proposed bulletin for the field.

Confusion exists at the present time with regard to the method and procedure of reporting the identity of Confidential General Investigative Informants, Confidential National Defense Informants, Confidential Plant Informants, and sources of information. The accompanying bulletin establishes a uniform procedure in this regard.

While it is realized that this bulletin will have little application to Confidential General Investigative Informants, nevertheless it is felt that uniformity will simplify the matter for the field and remove any question that may exist in this regard.

Respectfully,

R. H. Cunningham
R. H. Cunningham



Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth ☒ _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

66-2542

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

July 31, 1941

SJT:MLG

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

RE: Reporting Confidential Informants.

Bureau bulletin #17, First Series 1941, dated May 15, 1941, on page 23 sets forth:

"In the case of information furnished the field office by an individual who is not carried as a regular CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMANT, CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT, or CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANT, and whose identity should not be made known to persons outside the Bureau, the identity of such individual should not be disclosed in reports which will be transmitted to agencies outside the Bureau. In such cases, it will be necessary for the individual to be given a temporary symbol, and the first letter of this symbol should be the letter "T". The Bureau of course in these cases must be advised by a separate communication marked "Confidential," reflecting the identity of such individuals referred to in reports".

Bureau bulletin #8, First Series 1941, dated February 18, 1941, sets forth on page 2 the following instructions to the field to discontinue the practice of including undeveloped leads in an investigative report proper, as follows:

"In order that the Bureau and division offices receiving copies of reports and letters may be advised as to the identity of persons from whom information is obtained, a separate sheet should be affixed to investigative reports and letters, setting forth appropriate identifying data concerning the various sources of information, contacts and informants who are referred to in each report or letter."

It appears, therefore, that the instructions in Bulletin #17 counteract or void in part the instructions contained in Bulletin #8. The result is confusion in the field and this confusion in the field results in confusion in the Bureau's Administrative Section.

We are in receipt of two letters from SAC Shivers of Honolulu re [redacted] Information Concerning, and

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JUL 31 1941
FIVE

b7D


66-2542-3-74

July 31, 1941

[redacted], with aliases, Internal Security (C), wherein the confidential informants mentioned in reports of two Special Agents are set out in letter form and not as an extra page on the back of the investigative report. b7D

This situation is most undesirable and should be clarified immediately by the National Defense Division. The field should be informed exactly what practice is desired and further reference should be made to the two bulletins above referred to in order that the situation may be clarified.

Respectfully,


S. J. Tracy

Ex Conference

Tolson
Foran
Ladd
Clegg
Carson
Rosen
Ea Tamm
Nichols
Tracy

On Aug 8 noted to
send out Bulletin
to clarify the
apparent confusion

JS
5/2/41

Bulletin to all SAC's

y gnh
JEM:RMW

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

August 25, 1941

Transmit the following message to:

ALBANY	MIAMI
BIRMINGHAM	MILWAUKEE
BOSTON	NEWARK
BUTTE	NEW HAVEN
CHARLOTTE	NEW ORLEANS
CHICAGO	NEW YORK
CINCINNATI	OMAHA
CLEVELAND	PHILADELPHIA
DALLAS	PHOENIX
DENVER	PITTSBURGH
DES MOINES	PORTLAND
DETROIT	SAINT LOUIS
GRAND RAPIDS	SAINT PAUL
HONOLULU	SAN ANTONIO
HOUSTON	SAN DIEGO
INDIANAPOLIS	SAN FRANCISCO
JUNEAU	SAN JUAN
KANSAS CITY	SAVANNAH
KNOXVILLE	SEATTLE
LOS ANGELES	SPRINGFIELD
LOUISVILLE	WASHINGTON

SUBMIT IMMEDIATELY SEPARATE LETTER RE EACH REGULARLY PAID CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PLANT INFORMANT RECEIVING IN EXCESS OF [REDACTED] PER MONTH. STATE AMOUNT PAID, WHEN SERVICES COMMENCED, TOGETHER WITH A BRIEF STATEMENT AS TO THE NATURE OF INFORMATION ACTUALLY FURNISHED TO DATE, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS IN THIS REGARD.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

(TELETYPE)

DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842pmv/mc/jc

RECORDED

66-2542-3-74X
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

AUG 26 1941

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

169

b7E

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-3-74X

LAH:NET

September 17, 1941

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 PmJ/mc/SC
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

THE DIRECTOR

DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-13-91
7-13-81

There is set out below the total number of names in the Sources of Information File, Contact File, and Confidential Informant File in each of the Bureau's field offices. This information was requested in Bureau Bulletin #29, dated August 1, 1941. These figures are exclusive of the American Legion. *W*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 PmJ/mc/SC

Office	Sources of Information	Contacts	Confidential Informants
Albany, New York	794	13	937
Atlanta, Georgia	1702	33	209
Baltimore, Maryland	302	28	101
Birmingham, Alabama	1484	30	190
Boston, Massachusetts	504	70	445
Buffalo, New York	642	13	114
Butte, Montana	319	16	255
Charlotte, N. C.	217	54	409
Chicago, Illinois	948	52	37
Cincinnati, Ohio	235	14	179
Cleveland, Ohio	936	31	99
Dallas, Texas	1492	17	62
Denver, Colorado	295	8	23
Des Moines, Iowa	919	31	122
Detroit, Michigan	471	65	1477
El Paso, Texas	725	35	309
Grand Rapids, Michigan	1092	22	218
Honolulu, Hawaii	484	40	159
Houston, Texas	282	10	95
Huntington, West Virginia	638	13	219
Indianapolis, Indiana	779	120	517
Jackson, Mississippi	223	150	78
Juneau, Alaska	188	22	7
Kansas City, Missouri	653	67	326
Knoxville, Tennessee	198	12	62
Little Rock, Arkansas	76	25	90
Los Angeles, California	1430	49	1024

Tolson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Foxworth
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Gandy

DECLASSIFIED BY 66-5542-7560X
ON 11-19-94

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-5542-7560X

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 22 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office	Sources of Information	Contacts	Confidential Informants
Louisville, Kentucky	377	26	102
Memphis, Tennessee	615	41	127
Miami, Florida	551	132	219
Milwaukee, Wisconsin	182	676	545
Newark, New Jersey	2577	25	1116
New Haven, Connecticut	722	82	467
New Orleans, Louisiana	636	8	179
New York, New York	2340	226	370
New York, New York (Nat'l. Def. Div.)	325	0	89
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma	1579	31	141
Omaha, Nebraska	198	33	23
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	1225	325	257
Phoenix, Arizona	632	32	133
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	1697	67	251
Portland, Oregon	637	12	116
Providence, Rhode Island	216	4	83
Richmond, Virginia	325	4	56
Saint Louis, Missouri	666	62	265
Saint Paul, Minnesota	727	64	51
Salt Lake City, Utah	634	42	199
San Antonio, Texas	347	48	231
San Diego, California	348	13	359
San Francisco, California	1317	0	500
San Juan, Puerto Rico	402	5	22
Savannah, Georgia	459	48	177
Seattle, Washington	637	10	234
Sioux Falls, South Dakota	701	52	224
Springfield, Illinois	509	535	638
Washington, D. C.	649	63	175

Bureau Bulletin #29 requests that a comparative report be submitted by November 10, 1941, at which time another tabulation will be prepared.

Respectfully,

H. H. Clegg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JHW:MES

October 8, 1941

~~65-37361~~
66-2542 - 3-75 ✓

RECORDED

Special Agent in Charge
Boston, Massachusetts

Re: [REDACTED]
ESPIONAGE - G.

Dear Sir:

I am transmitting herewith appropriate copies of a letter dated September 16, 1941 from [REDACTED] to the Bureau concerning [REDACTED] which is self-explanatory.

It is desired that [REDACTED] be interviewed for any further information that he may have concerning [REDACTED]. At that time consideration should be given to conducting an investigation of [REDACTED] to determine whether he is engaged in activities inimical to the best interests of this Government.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 DMJ
mc/jc

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

Enclosure

CH-167
22

180

65-37361-1

b7D

RECORDED

~~65-27363-2~~
66-2542-3-75
JHW:PES

October 8, 1941

Mr. Wesley M. Mower
Attorney at Law
Old Orchard Beach, Maine

Dear Mr. Mower:

This will acknowledge your letter dated September 16, 1941. I wish to express my appreciation to you for having made the information set out therein available to me. You may be assured that it has been carefully noted and will be made a part of the permanent records of this Bureau.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 pmj

mc/jc

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-27363-1

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

144
CH-23

C. FAYETTE STAPLES POST

NO. 87

**THE AMERICAN LEGION
OLD ORCHARD BEACH, MAINE**

September 16, 1941.

**Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, D. C.**

Gentlemen,

Mr. Stanislaus Zbyszko, former heavyweight wrestling champion, who makes his home here has just returned from Detroit and is much concerned about the possible activities of a German by the name of Richard Stecker who was an active agent of Germany during the First World War, and an agent for the Schimmelpfennig, but under another name.

Mr. Zbyszko has had a great deal of experience in connection with such matters as he has travelled over the world and hears a great deal that the average person does not, as he speaks fluently in many languages, for which reason I felt that it should be passed along as coming from a reliable source. If he could be procured he would very valuable in certain sections, being familiar with all of the western continent, and in fact a large part of the world.

The man Stecker formerly stopped at the Gotham Hotel but has recently moved.

Yours very truly,

Wesley M. Newell

62-2542-3
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SEP 18 1941
FIVE

Don't write in card index

Indianapolis Ind
Sept 19, 1941

Stephen Early
Secretary to the President
White House
Washington D. C.

Justice

Dear Sir


I am sending this letter
to you hoping you will see fit
to present it to Mr. Roosevelt.

(Pardon the pencil but
I ran out of ink.)

Yours Truly

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2542 PMJ/mc/bc




RESPECTFULLY REFERRED
FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT
AND CONSIDERATION

W. M. McGuire
Secretary to the President

Letter to Mr. Ruckey
cc [unclear]
[unclear] 10/11

EX-10
RECORDED
INDEXED
RECORDED



Indianapolis Ind
Sept, 17, 1941

President of United States:

White House
Washington D. C.

Dear Sir:

I hope you see this letter
and see fit to act upon it.

I have ~~an~~ an idea for contacting
one of the espionage groups of the
Axis Powers in this country and
gaining their confidence in such
a manner that I will be able
to give information of value to the
law and break up or check their
activities or at least attempt to
would like to have official sanction
of such an action. I want no pay
from the Government and no publicity.
I only hope that if my attempt is
successful I might be able to get an
appointment in one of the Federal law
enforcement agencies.

I am a natural born citizen
and will welcome any investigation
you care to make of me or my character.
Sincerely,
[Redacted]

b6
b7C

66-2542-3-76

After days, return to

b6
b7C



BUY
DEFENSE
BONDS AND



Personal

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 JMD
mc b7c

Mr Stephen Early
White House
Washington
D.C.

DATE 7-13-81 BY 28429mi
mclsc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

President of the United
States

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY SP-1 MAC
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FOIM, II, 1-2.4.2.
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-81

August 13, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2542 DMJ
mc/SC
CONFIDENTIAL

THE DIRECTOR

Attached hereto is a memorandum containing a Bureau analysis of the really productive, worthwhile Confidential National Defense Informants throughout the Field. It will be noted that there is a total of 67 informants falling within this category. *(XW)*

The total of 67 productive informants reflects an increase of 14 such informants since the preparation of the memorandum dated July 19, 1941. This increase is due first to information, furnished by certain Special Agents in Charge, to the effect that the earlier memorandum failed to reflect the names of certain persons whom they consider as truly productive key informants in their division. In addition, there is included in this memorandum the names of new informants developed since the preparation of the memorandum dated July 19, 1941. *(XW)*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

By way of recapitulation there is set out for your convenience and information hereinafter a tabulation of these informants, together with their names by Field Office, listed as to the type of information being furnished by them. Additional background and personal information concerning each informant mentioned is set forth in the attached memorandum. *(XW)*

ALBANY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

ALBANY SUBAREA SECTION

ATLANTA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	2	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

BALTIMORE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	
German activities:	0	

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
8 SEP 25 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

b7D

BALTIMORE FIELD DIVISION (Continued)

Informants on Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

BIRMINGHAM FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

BOSTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 1
Japanese activities: 0

BUFFALO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

BUTTE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

CHARLOTTE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

CHICAGO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

CINCINNATI FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 1

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CINCINNATI FIELD DIVISION (Continued)

Informants on Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

CLEVELAND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

DALLAS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

DENVER FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

DES MOINES FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

DETROIT FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2
German activities: 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

EL PASO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

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GRAND RAPIDS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

HONOLULU FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 1
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 1

HOUSTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

HUNTINGTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

INDIANAPOLIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 1
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

JACKSON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~JUNEAU FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

KANSAS CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

KNOXVILLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

LITTLE ROCK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

LOS ANGELES FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 1
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 1

LOUISVILLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 1
Japanese activities: 0

MEMPHIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

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MIAMI FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2
 German activities: 1
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

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MILWAUKEE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 1
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

NEWARK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

NEW HAVEN FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
 German activities: 0
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

NEW ORLEANS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 1
 German activities: 1
 Italian activities: 0
 Japanese activities: 0

NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 3

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION (Continued)

Informants on German activities: 2

Italian activities: 1
Japanese activities: 1

OKLAHOMA CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

OMAHA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

PHILADELPHIA FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 1
Japanese activities: 0

PHOENIX FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

PITTSBURGH FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2
German activities: 2
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

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PORTLAND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	
German activities:	0	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

RICHMOND FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

SAINT LOUIS FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0	
German activities:	1	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

SAINT PAUL FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

SALT LAKE CITY FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

SAN ANTONIO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	1	
German activities:	2	
Italian activities:	0	
Japanese activities:	0	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAN DIEGO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SAN FRANCISCO FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 4

German activities: 2

Italian activities: 1
Japanese activities: 2

SAN JUAN FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SAVANNAH FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 0
German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 0

SEATTLE FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities: 2

German activities: 0
Italian activities: 0
Japanese activities: 1

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SIoux FALLS FIELD DIVISION


Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

SPRINGFIELD FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	0
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0

WASHINGTON FIELD DIVISION

Informants on Communist activities:	0
German activities:	1
Italian activities:	0
Japanese activities:	0



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Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JTH:ums

August 13, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

THE DIRECTOR

There is herein set forth a list of Confidential National Defense Informants who can be considered as key informants in the particular Field Divisions wherein they are situated.

[Redacted]

EX-106 bja/lp
4-22-99
83-1343

b7D

This informant, on July 14, 1941, was granted authority to proceed to [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(u)

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 Pm2.m2/SC
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2/3
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-14-81

[Redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

This informant has been a member of the [Redacted]

has been furnishing information to the Atlanta Field Office concerning this organization.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Mr. Tolson _____

Mr. E. A. Tamm _____

Mr. Clegg _____

Mr. Foxworth _____

Mr. Glavin _____

Mr. Ladd _____

Mr. Nichols _____

Mr. Rosen _____

Mr. Carson _____

Mr. Drayton _____

Mr. Quinn Tamm _____

Mr. Hendon _____

Mr. Tracy _____

Miss Gandy _____

This informant is [Redacted]

is not a member of any organization.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

[Redacted]

(u)

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This informant was authorized on July 1, 1941, to receive [Redacted] per month for a period of three months. He has furnished information regarding

[Redacted]

[Redacted] He, himself, is not a member of the Communist Party. (u)

[Redacted]

(u)

He has been authorized to receive [Redacted] per month for a period of three months and has furnished the Albany Field Office with information concerning [Redacted] meetings, although not a member.

[Redacted]

(u)

This informant was employed at [Redacted] and furnished

[Redacted]

[Redacted] . She is not a member of any Italian organization. (u)

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 3 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted] (u)
This informant is a [redacted] and is furnishing the Buffalo Field Office with information concerning the [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] (u)
This informant is being paid [redacted] per month, having made a survey of [redacted] and is going to make a similar survey of [redacted]. Although at one time he was a [redacted] he is no longer associated with it.

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[redacted]
This informant is being paid [redacted] per month, having been authorized June 4, 1941; works for the [redacted]. She merely works for this organization and is not a member.

[redacted] (u)
Has been paid [redacted] per week and is a member of [redacted] [redacted] furnishing information to the Chicago Field Office. (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 4 -



~~INFILE~~

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She has been accepted as a member of [redacted] and belongs to the [redacted]. She furnishes information concerning the activities of these organizations to the Chicago Field Office.



Authority has been granted to pay this informant [redacted] per month. He is a [redacted]. He is not a member of any [redacted] and is furnishing information to the Cincinnati Field Office.



~~(u)~~
Is a general informant on [redacted] activities for the Cincinnati Field Office and is being paid [redacted] per month. At the present time he is not a member of [redacted].



~~(u)~~
Furnishes general [redacted] information to the Cleveland Field Office and is being paid [redacted] per week for two months; authorized June 10, 1941. He is not a member of the Party.

~~INFILE~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 5 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

This informant writes and speaks [redacted] has a good following among the nationality groups in Cleveland, although not a member of any of them. Furnishes information to the Cleveland Field Office.

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[redacted] (u)

Was authorized June 25, 1941, to be paid [redacted] per month for a period of three months, furnishing the Detroit Field Office with information regarding [redacted] in this district, he, himself, not being a member of the Party.

[redacted] (u)

Works at [redacted] and turns over all information concerning [redacted] to the Detroit Field Office. Was authorized on July 1, 1941, to be paid [redacted] per month for 90 days, and he is not a member of the organization. (u)

[redacted]

Was authorized on April 24, 1941, to be paid on a C.O.D. basis; has submitted information to the Detroit Field Office regarding [redacted] including names, addresses, occupations, descriptions and pertinent statements made concerning [redacted] He has close association but no membership in any [redacted] organization.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 6 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

Has furnished valuable information concerning [redacted]
Honolulu and was authorized on June 19, 1941, to be paid [redacted] per
month for a period of 90 days. He is employed by [redacted]
[redacted] Does not belong to the [redacted]

[redacted]

Is [redacted] and has been informing the
Honolulu Field Office of [redacted] activities taking place in Honolulu;
was authorized on April 14, 1941, to be paid [redacted] per month. Does
not belong to any [redacted] societies.

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[redacted] & (u)

This informant has been developing information relative to [redacted]
[redacted] and possibly
either [redacted] was a member of the [redacted] and is now
establishing recontact; is being paid on a C.O.D. basis. (u)

[redacted] (u)

Has possession of information regarding [redacted] activities in the Houston
Field Division, and can obtain additional information from time to time
through friends of his in [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 7 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

who are members of [redacted] According to the Houston Field Office he is producing excellently and is being paid [redacted] per day, not to exceed [redacted] per month.

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[redacted] (u)
Was authorized July 2, 1941, to be paid [redacted] per week for a period of 60 days; has accomplished considerable for the Indianapolis Field Office in connection with [redacted] activities in the [redacted] region, and was asked by the [redacted] to attend the [redacted]
[redacted] (u)

[redacted] (u)
On May 20, 1941, he was authorized to receive [redacted] per week for a period of 60 days. He furnishes general information concerning [redacted] to the Kansas City Field Office, although not a member of [redacted]

[redacted]
Has been furnishing valuable information in connection with [redacted] to the Louisville Field Office. Is not a member of any subversive organization.

[redacted]
Is furnishing the Los Angeles Field Office with information concerning [redacted] in that area and is being paid [redacted] per week for [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 8 -

a period of two months since June 23, 1941. Has no association through membership in any [] clubs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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[]
Is furnishing information regarding [] activities in the Los Angeles Field Division and was authorized on May 14, 1941, to be paid [] per week for a period of 60 days. This informant has associated with individuals connected with the [] being accepted by them as one of their own.

[]
He is a member of the [] and is being paid by the Bureau the sum of \$200.00 per month. *X (u)*

[]
Was authorized on July 16, 1941, to be paid \$25.00 per month for a period of three months. He is a member of [] and is closely associated with [] in Louisville, Kentucky. *X (u)*

[]
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 9 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Is furnishing Miami Field Office with information concerning [redacted]
[redacted] Is well acquainted with the methods used by the [redacted]
[redacted] and is friendly with the [redacted] in this district
and in [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] (u)
This informant is a member of the [redacted]
and is furnishing the Miami Field Office with information regarding its
members and other Communists known to him.

[redacted] (u)
This informant is a member of the [redacted] and is an active
informant on [redacted] matters in the Miami Field Division.

[redacted] (u)
This informant furnishes information of value concerning the [redacted]
[redacted] in Milwaukee, although he is not a member of that organization.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 10 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This informant [redacted]

[redacted] Is very cooperative and has furnished the Milwaukee Field Office information regarding general [redacted] activities. Is not a member of any of the organizations.

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[redacted] X(u)
He is a member of [redacted] of Louisville and is paid [redacted] per month for a period of three months, being authorized June 17, 1941.

[redacted] (u)
Was authorized on June 17, 1941, to receive [redacted] per month for a period of three months. He furnishes the New Orleans Field Office with information regarding [redacted] activities in that district, through association with members of the various clubs. He, himself, is not a member.

[redacted] (u)
On May 13, 1941, she was authorized to receive [redacted] per week for a period of 90 days and on July 9, 1941, [redacted] a week was added to that amount. She is [redacted] a member of the [redacted]
[redacted] (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 11 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

(u)
He is a member of the [REDACTED] and authorization was given on February 25, 1941, to pay him [REDACTED] a day for 60 days.

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[REDACTED]

Furnishes the New York City Field Office with information concerning persons who are [REDACTED] in that district. It is possible that he was, or will be, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Has been authorized to receive [REDACTED] per week and furnishes continuous information regarding [REDACTED] activities in New York City and vicinity, but does not belong to any of the organizations.

[REDACTED]

(u)
Was authorized on June 25, 1941, to receive [REDACTED] per month for a period of 90 days. He is one of the most productive informants in the Bureau.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 12 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

securing valuable information concerning [redacted] in the United States. (S)(u)

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b7E

[redacted]

This informant gives very good information concerning various peace organizations, including [redacted]. He was authorized on May 3, 1941, to receive [redacted] a day for a period of 90 days. He is a member of the above-named organization.

[redacted]

Are receiving [redacted] per week for six months, having been authorized on May 21, 1941. [redacted] is extremely embittered against [redacted] due to the [redacted]

[redacted]
forwarding any information she might secure to the Philadelphia Field Office. Her husband will aid her in her work.

[redacted]

(S)(u)

On June 23, 1941, he was authorized to receive [redacted] per week for a period of 10 weeks. He is a [redacted]

[redacted] He is furnishing the Philadelphia Field Office with information concerning [redacted] activities in that district. (S)(u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 13 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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[REDACTED]

(u)

He is receiving [REDACTED] per week for a period of 90 days, having been authorized on May 22, 1941, by the Pittsburgh Field Office. He is furnishing information concerning the [REDACTED] and at the present time is attempting to join that organization. (u)

[REDACTED]

Was authorized on May 15, 1941, to receive [REDACTED] per week for 12 weeks. He is active in securing information of value pertaining to [REDACTED] activities, their organizations and other relative matters; is presently working on the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Is furnishing the Pittsburgh Office with information regarding persons of [REDACTED] was authorized on June 19, 1941, to receive [REDACTED] per month for a period of 60 days. He does not belong to any of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 14 - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Was authorized to receive [] per month for information concerning the [] of which he is a member. He is also a student of Duquesne University.

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[]

(u)

He is a member of the []
He is paid [] per week, plus [] per week expenses, for three months, having been authorized July 18, 1941.

[]

This informant is being paid [] per month for his information regarding the [] activities in the vicinity of St. Louis. Is not a member of any subversive organization.

[]

(u)

On June 25, 1941, was authorized to receive [] per week for three months. He works [] around San Antonio, particularly concerning [] His activities do not include membership in any un-American organizations.

[]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 15 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Is paid [redacted] per month for his general undercover work, but particularly with regard to [redacted] activities. He also does not belong to any of the Nazi clubs.

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[redacted]

[redacted] and furnishes the San Antonio Field Office with information concerning [redacted] activities in that district. On July 9, 1941, was authorized to receive [redacted] per week for a period of 90 days. He receives his information from members of the [redacted]

[redacted]

is a member of the [redacted] in San Francisco and furnishes an account of their activities to the San Francisco Field Office: *(u)*

[redacted]

He is employed [redacted] is a member of the [redacted] and has recently been appointed an [redacted] in that district; is receiving [redacted] per month, having been authorized March 24, 1941. *(u)*

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 16 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Is receiving [] per month for the information he furnishes concerning [] activities in that district. He does not belong to any of the clubs. (u)

[]

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Was authorized on May 24, 1941, to receive [] per month for three months for the information he was furnishing concerning [] activities in San Francisco, although not belonging to any of the Fascist societies.

[]

Is being paid [] per month, plus [] expenses, by the San Francisco Field Office. She has gained the confidence of several prominent [] in San Francisco and speaks [] and is also acquainted with prominent []

[]

(u)

Was authorized on April 11, 1941, to receive [] per month for his information concerning the [] of which he is a member.

[]

(u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 17 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This informant [redacted] and [redacted] furnishes the San Francisco Field Office with information concerning [redacted] but does not belong to any organizations. (u)

[redacted]

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Was authorized on June 10, 1941, to receive [redacted] per month for the information he was furnishing on [redacted] activities in California. He is connected with [redacted] receiving most of his information through [redacted]

[redacted]

Was authorized to receive, on July 1, 1941, [redacted] per month for a period of three months for his information on [redacted] activities in the San Francisco Field District, even though he does not belong to any of their societies.

[redacted]

Furnishes the Seattle Field Office with information concerning [redacted] activities, and was authorized on May 20, 1941, to receive [redacted] per month for a period of three months. This man is [redacted] and was previously [redacted] but was removed after further investigation.

[redacted]

(u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

- 18 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

He has been connected with the [redacted] and informs the Seattle Field Office of Communist activities in that area. At the present time, is being paid [redacted] per month for his information. (u)

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[redacted] (u)
This informant is a former member of the [redacted] but maintains connections with that organization through its members. Is being paid on an intermittent basis, according to value of information received. (u)

[redacted]
The Washington Field Office was authorized by Mr. Drayton to pay this informant [redacted] per day, and he was given [redacted] in cash to cover expenses and salary prior to [redacted]. He is a [redacted] [redacted] and was sent to Chicago to develop information regarding [redacted]. He also has numerous contacts with the [redacted]. This informant is returning to [redacted] in the near future and his services will be terminated.

Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED

PDB:RUB

66-2542-3-76

October 1, 1941



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 pnd/jmc
JC

b7D

Dear

Please be advised that your letter dated September 17, 1941, directed to Mr. Stephen Early, Secretary to the President of the United States, has been referred to this Bureau.


Your courtesy and interest in bringing this matter to the attention of the Federal Government are indeed appreciated. Should you feel that you possess information which you believe would be of interest to this Bureau, it is suggested that you communicate directly with Mr. S. J. Drayton, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Department of Justice, 323 Federal Building, Indianapolis, Indiana.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

cc - Indianapolis (with cc of incoming)



WTC
DSC

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Newark, New Jersey

September 25, 1941.

EDD:MH

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 Pmk/mc/j
JC

Dear Sir:

Special Agent (A) EUGENE D. DIXON has called to my attention a suggestion which could be of value to the Bureau in connection with its National Defense investigations.

He has advised me that he had a talk with [redacted] the Business Branch of the Public Library located on Commerce Street, Newark, New Jersey. The results of their conversation are as follows:

[redacted] stated that their library, together with other business libraries, has a world of information concerning the United States, some of which she feels would be most valuable to a person bent on subversive activities. Included in these libraries are data concerning Army and Navy contracts, details concerning plants in the United States, where they are located, and general information concerning their manufacturing ability. She advised Special Agent DIXON that often times suspicious persons come into the library and ask for information of this type. She feels that some of these people are not gathering this information to further their education because they do not appear to be the intellectual type. In that connection, she felt that the Bureau should be informed of these requests, which information should at least be a matter of record with the Bureau.

[redacted] advised that the libraries could take the names and addresses of all persons desiring information of a particular type or special arrangements could be worked out whereby the names and addresses of persons using a particular kind of service could be obtained. [redacted] the event this might not be desirable the names and addresses of

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106-2542-3-78
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SEP 29 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FIVE
PERM. FILES

Letter to Director

September 25, 1941.

all persons using the library could be obtained on a large register with appropriate notations by the librarian as to the kind of information requested by each individual. She advised that some of the libraries do use a register and it could be installed in all libraries without any difficulty.

In the case of an explosion in some plant where there are no suspects, these lists maintained by the libraries might be very helpful to the Bureau in furnishing the names of all persons who have done considerable reading on explosives. Investigations of these persons might possibly lead to the individual who caused the explosion. It is believed that there are possibly other instances where these lists maintained by the libraries would prove to be very helpful to the Bureau.

[redacted] stated that she felt that if the Bureau would explain the situation to all libraries and request that they do what has been set forth in this letter that they would be more than glad to do so. [redacted] furnished a list of all the Business Libraries in the United States, which are as follows:

b7D

California

Los Angeles Public Library, Science and Industry
Department, 530 S. Hope Street.

San Diego Public Library, Business and Technology
Department - across the street from the
Central Building

San Francisco Public Library, Business Branch,
629 Russ Building.

Connecticut

Hartford Business Branch of Public Library,
730 Main Street

Waterbury Silas Bunson Library, Business and In-
dustrial Department in the Central Building.

Illinois

Peoria Business Department of Public Library
in the Central Building

Letter to Director

September 25, 1941.

Indiana

Indianapolis

Business Branch of Public Library,
Ohio and Meridan Streets.

South Bend

Business and Industrial Department
of Public Library located in
building at rear of the Central Library
lot.

Maryland

Baltimore

Enoch Pratt Free Library, Business and
Economics Department, located in Central
Library.

Massachusetts

Boston

Public Library, Kirstein Business Branch,
20 City Hall Avenue

Minnesota

Minneapolis

Public Library, Business and Municipal
Branch, 508 Second Avenue, South

New Jersey

Newark

Business Branch, 34 Commerce Street

Trenton

Free Public Library, Business and
Technical Department, Central Library
on Academy Street.

New York

New York City

Economics Division, 5th Avenue and 42nd St.

Rochester

Business and Economics Division in Central
Library Building, 115 South Avenue

Albany

John L. Pryn Library, 137 No. Pearl

Letter to Director

September 25, 1941.

Ohio

Cleveland

Business Information Bureau in
Central Library, 325 Superior Avenue.

Pennsylvania

Pittsburgh

Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh,
Business District Branch, 247 Union
Trust Building

Rhode Island

Providence

Business Branch of the Library
on the mezzanine of the Chamber of
Commerce Building

Tennessee

Nashville

Public Library, Business Branch in
reference department of the Central
Library.

Although it is felt that some of the requests of these libraries would be legitimate, it is believed that the Bureau might desire to direct the field offices covering the cities in which these libraries are located to make some arrangements with the libraries whereby they would maintain a register of persons desiring information which might be considered highly technical and of a vital nature. These registers may prove valuable to the Bureau in investigations of espionage and sabotage.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Conroy

E. E. CONROY
Special Agent in Charge

DML:CSH

October 2, 1941

MR. TAMM

I communicated with Mr. Foxworth in New York with reference to the attached letter from "Neil", and suggested that he have Mr. Guerin contact [redacted] in an effort to enlist his aid in furnishing information which may come to his attention on his trips [redacted]

Respectfully,

D. M. Ladd

DECLASSIFIED BY 8068ja/Sjs
ON 4-22-94
89-1343

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 8068ja/Sjs
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-3-91
2-13-81

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
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OTHERWISE

RECORDED 66-25423-179

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 4 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Initials on Original

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

Thanks for

Chicago; picked it up last night. Passing through Wall

Y go

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 DMJ/mc/j

Aboard

September 25, 1941

51784

Dear Edgar:-

I understand that a boat called 'The Hermes', which anchors near the Floyd Bennett airport in Sheepshead (?) Bay, is manned by three lads who profess and boast of their German nationality. They are said to work in a bar in the Wall St district in the daytime. One of them told a friend of mine the other day that the USA was stupid, and people didn't pay enough attention to what was going on inside the country. He said at night he often put-putted up the Lower Bay of New York, chatted with merchantmen at anchor there, learned their departure date and any other information he desired. He said that soldiers on Governor's Island told him 'Plenty'.

I found a letter in Chicago from [redacted] saying she was beginning work at [redacted] again - last Thursday; and is living at [redacted]. Shall keep the 'contact' open with postcards and an occasional letter, in case you need any information from there that you can't secure otherwise.

Incidentally [redacted] (whose name has now been legalized as that!) will be at the [redacted] for a day or two. He leaves shortly for [redacted] on some of his own and [redacted] business. I have known him [redacted] years rather well and never have found him wanting. Am sure he might find out some very good information for you - so why don't you contact him. He suggested to me he'd like to contact ONI, and I told him I'd get in touch with 'my people in Washington' instead. I think he thought I meant the White House; so would be surprised at nothing. He is the originator of the [redacted] in the [redacted]

[redacted] I believe; and has just won a suit against [redacted] etc for taking his trade name. You will like him immensely, and as far as I know he is perfectly honorable - a great admirer of FD's, and his information should prove valuable.

RECORDED

The further west I go the more doubtful I become over the year. It seems to me I may be putting my neck way out, what with this Isolationist section of the country where Lindbergh, Wheeler, etc go so well.

I may run over to [redacted] for Saturday and Sunday instead of [redacted] as [redacted] writes me there is renewed activity in rather conclusively nasty nature. Will keep in touch by wire.

Yours always,

b7D

ORIGINAL

66-2542

RECORDS INVESTIGATION

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NEW YORK

SEP 26 1941

RECEIVED

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Tele. Room _____
Tour Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Miss Gahm _____
Candy _____

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

LBN:WGR

September 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

Re: [REDACTED]

b7D

Re reference of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I talked to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] with whom [REDACTED] has a slight acquaintance.
[REDACTED] is a man approximately [REDACTED] years of age, who has
the equivalent of a [REDACTED] he left [REDACTED] during
the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He speaks [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] fluently. He is a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] At the present
time he is employed on the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

This individual makes a very good appearance,
he handles himself exceptionally well and he stated that
he would like to cooperate with the Bureau in any possible
way and would also like to secure a position if it were
possible. He does not have [REDACTED] for which
reason I told him that we could not give him a permanent
appointment and it was not necessary to even consider this.

The thought, however, occurs that this individual
might develop into a good contact and might be used by the
New York office. Accordingly, I gave him an application
blank and told him to fill it out and also told him to see
Mr. Connolly in the New York office sometime at his con-
venience.

Respectfully,

L. B. Nichols

CH-13
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842 [signature] me/jc

RECORDED
INDEXED
EX-18

66-25423-79X
SEP 29 1941
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
TOLSON
FOXWORTH
THREE
FIVE

c
o
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y gmh

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C.
September 6, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

RE: RAYMOND H. WILLIAMS
In-Service Training
School 8/24/41 -
9/7/41.

(E X C E R P T)

He offered two suggestions which are attached hereto.

S. J. Tracy.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 DMJ/mj

RECORDED

66-2542-2-7924
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 30 1941 A. M.
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TOLSON
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Nease
Gandy

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - 8

EX-3

ORIGINAL FILED IN 1-19-575X

Copy made and return with

Re-indexed
this serial only
10/27/58
J39
mi
10/27/58
p shw

233
CH-18

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o
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y gmh

Raymond H. Williams
In-Service Training
School 8/25/41 - 9/7/41

SUGGESTIONS

#1

While in the Retraining School, Special Agent Williams stated that some of the supervisors, i. e. those handling such lectures as the Registration Act and Voorhis Act, quote at considerable length from Statutes. As a request, it is necessary that extended notes be taken. In view of the fact that the time of the lectures is rather short, he suggests that those supervisors who discuss Statutes in detail and quote either portions or all of the Statute, have available mimeographed outlines setting forth the provisions of the Statute in order in which they are discussed; that this will save the time of the Agents taking notes and will enable the class to cover more ground than is presently possible.

#2

Special Agent Williams stated that the matter of confidential informants was discussed during the Retraining Class and that the questions arose as to the mass production of informants in the field. He stated that a majority of those in the class seemed to feel that producing a specified number of informants within a specified definite time does not produce the best results; that, for example, if an Agent is given an assignment to produce twenty informant in so many days, the quality of the informants will not be sufficiently good and that he believes it would be better for fewer informants to be developed and develop these informants to a higher degree and handle them in greater detail.

Agent Williams was advised that his suggestion would be considered by the Bureau.

st

ORIGINAL FILED IN 1-19-

66-2542-3-77X1

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



GCC:HMV:MM

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
October 7, 1941

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Foxworth _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Drayton _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Tracy _____
Miss Gandy _____

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

Re: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL
DEFENSE INFORMANTS

There is attached hereto for your approval
a proposed letter to all SAC's instructing them in
the procedure to be followed by the field concerning
the handling of paid confidential informants.

Respectfully,

R. H. Cunningham
R. H. Cunningham

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 P/W/mc/jc

RECORDED

66-2542-2-80
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
2 OCT 21 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LADD
LADD

Comp. inst. sent. Intell. Work - sent

187

RECORDED

INDEXED

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF *Class FK*
DATE *10-16/87*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

October 17, 1941

SAC ALBANY	DETROIT	MEMPHIS	RICHMOND
ATLANTA	EL PASO	MIAMI	ST. LOUIS
BALTIMORE	GRAND RAPIDS	MILWAUKEE	ST. PAUL
BIRMINGHAM	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
BOSTON	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
BUFFALO	HUNTINGTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
BUTTE	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
CHARLOTTE	JACKSON	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAN JUAN
CHICAGO	JUNEAU	OMAHA	SAVANNAH
CINCINNATI	KANSAS CITY	PHILADELPHIA	SEATTLE
CLEVELAND	KNOXVILLE	PHOENIX	SIOUX FALLS
DALLAS	LITTLE ROCK	PITTSBURGH	SPRINGFIELD
DENVER	LOS ANGELES	PORTLAND	WASHINGTON, D. C.
DES MOINES	LOUISVILLE	PROVIDENCE	QUANTICO

Dear Sir:

DECLASSIFIED BY *2842 D.M. Dineen*
ON *2-13-81*

Your attention is directed to the provisions of Bureau Bulletin No. 17, First Series, dated May 15, 1941, which, under Section J details the steps to be taken concerning the development of Confidential National Defense Informants.

It is noted that on page 27 of this bulletin it is stated that in the event payments to confidential informants exceed \$2.50 per week or \$10 per month, prior Bureau authority must be obtained. The provisions of this bulletin must be observed.

The Bureau desires that in those instances where the Field has been authorized to pay an informant for a definite period of time, it will be necessary for each Special Agent in Charge to advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued. It will be necessary for the Special Agent in Charge to make a definite recommendation as to the rate of pay and at the same time to furnish the Bureau with a synopsis of the information which the informant has developed during the time he has been working for the Bureau. There have been numerous instances where Field Offices have been authorized to pay informants for certain designated periods of time and have continued payments to them long after the time has expired. This practice must be discontinued.

It is to be emphasized that the Bureau is very desirous of obtaining confidential informants in National Defense matters and, of

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R 582 JUL 25 1961

course, it is the duty of the Special Agents in Charge to evaluate the services of every informant and to recommend the amount of remuneration therefor. In order that the Bureau's records may be accurate, however, it is necessary that the above-mentioned procedure be followed in all cases.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

RECORDED

October 17, 1941

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
TAMM, E. A.
CLEGG
GLAVIN
LADD
NICHOLS
TRACY

CARSON
COFFEY
EGAN
HARBO
HENDON
HINCE
HOLLOMAN
KIMBALL

KRAMER
LAUGHLIN, R. H.
PATTERSON
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROSEN
TAMM, Q.

DECLASSIFIED BY 28127 D.M. [initials]
ON 2-13-87

Dear Sir:

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★ OCT 17 1941 to be emphasized that the Bureau is very desirous of obtaining confidential informants in National Defense matters and, of

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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R 582 JUL 18 1961

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Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

AIR MAIL

Bogota, Colombia
October 15, 1941.

Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

As of possible interest to the Bureau, one
Confidential Informant, [redacted]

[redacted] advised that the following individuals
are reliable anti-Nazi in the United States.

b7D

[redacted] age about [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] age about [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] age about [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

It, for any reason, the Bureau desires to
contact each or any of the above named persons
it will be entirely satisfactory if Informant
[redacted] name is used.

Information relative to [redacted] is contained
in my letter dated September 9, 1941, Bogota,
Communication # 2383.

RECEIVED

Yours very truly,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-14-81 BY [redacted]

Communication # 441

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF CLASSIFIED
DATE 10/6/81

PJW:AJ

October 24, 1941

Special Agent in Charge
New York, New York

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 DMJ/mc
REASON FOR EXTENSION 3
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-13-81
7-13-81

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OTHERWISE

RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS;
ESPIONAGE - I.

Dear Sir:

The Bureau has observed that the offices receiving copies of this letter appear to be the focal points of Italian activities in the United States. Despite the number of espionage investigations of this character which have been initiated, very little information, for the most part, has been developed to indicate the modus operandi of Italian agents operating in the United States and their means of communication. These investigations have failed to produce evidence to corroborate or substantiate the allegations of espionage activities on the part of individuals who allegedly are members of the Italian secret police. This deplorable situation undoubtedly is the result of the lack of confidential informants and the evident failure on the part of Special Agents in Charge to seek and develop the services of individuals who are familiar with, or in a position whereby they could obtain, information regarding actual espionage activities on the part of Italian agents. AW

It is generally conceded that one of the best means of obtaining such information is through the employment of confidential informants conversant with Italian activities. In this connection, the Bureau desires that each field office receiving copies of this communication transmit to the Bureau a list of those confidential informants who have been developed by your respective office and who have been or are furnishing your office with information which definitely indicates that individuals within your respective field division are obtaining and/or transmitting information to Italy or other foreign governments pertaining to the national defense of the United States. AW

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

RECORDED

66-2542-3-82

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

NOV 11 1941

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-821

SAC, New York City

Page 2

You are also requested to advise the Bureau as to the specific plan or procedure which you have taken or are pursuing to develop informants who may have access to information dealing with espionage activities of Italian agents. *[Handwritten initials]*

You are instructed to transmit the requested information to the Bureau not later than October 31, 1941.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

cc Seattle
Portland
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Diego
New Orleans
Philadelphia
Boston
Chicago
Buffalo
Newark
Miami

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

CONFIDENTIAL

PEF:MT

New York, N. Y.
October 29, 1941

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. D. M. Ladd

DECLASSIFIED BY *sp6 bja/plj*
ON *4-22-1991*
83-1343

Dear Sir:

Confirming my several telephone conversations with Mr. Ladd, this is to advise that upon receipt of the Bureau's instructions for Mr. Guerin to contact [redacted] in Guerin's absence I spoke to [redacted] with reference to his proposed trip to [redacted] telling him that he had been referred to us by [redacted]. He stated [redacted] had probably had several too many [redacted] further relating that he was going to [redacted] some time during the latter part of 1941 for a short business trip and that he would be very glad to be of any assistance possible at that time. He further advised that he [redacted] and was in New York for a brief business visit. *(u)*

During the conversation I indicated that he might be of value through furnishing us information locally as well as concerning his visit to [redacted]. He stated he would be glad to do this, and immediately upon his return to the Los Angeles office he would contact Special Agent in Charge R. B. Hood. *(u)*

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY *2842 DMD/mc/50*
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION *7-13-81*
7-13-8X

Very truly yours,

P. E. Foxworth
P. E. FOXWORTH
Assistant Director.

RECORDED

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<i>ms</i>	
66-2542-3-83	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
2 OCT 31 1941	
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE	
<i>CONFIDENTIAL</i>	

EX-10

CH-22

CONF. INFO. in general intelligence matter

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

October 9, 1941

EAT:GEG

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

b7D

I advised Mr. Bugas that you had recently received word indicating that the Detroit Office was depending too much on [redacted] for information concerning subversive activities and was asking [redacted] to evaluate information received from other sources relating to subversive activities. Mr. Bugas stated that this is not true and that, as a matter of fact, no Agent of the Detroit Office other than Bugas has contacted [redacted] in the past two years. Bugas states that he makes a practice of contacting [redacted] about once every three months merely for the purpose of keeping his contact with him alive. He states that [redacted] has no information concerning subversive activities and is of no use to the office as a source of this type of information.

Bugas advised, in confidence, of course, that he has two confidential informants who work for [redacted] and that whenever he wants anything from the Ford organization he obtains it from these informants. One of these sources of information is a man named [redacted]. The other is an informant named [redacted] who is the [redacted] and who works in the [redacted]. Bugas states that [redacted] does not know of the office contact with either of these two men.

Mr. Bugas states that he has not at any time furnished any information to Bennett and that he does not check any information with him.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-13-81 BY 2842phm/me/JC

RECORDED

INDEXED

66-2542-3-84
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 OCT 24 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TOLSON
OLLEGG
NICHOLS
FIDEL

EX-1

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Foxworth
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Carson
Mr. Drayton
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Harbo
Tele. Room
Tour Room
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tracy
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

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CCO:MK

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-150

W

OCTOBER 31, 1941

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

Transmit the following message to:

BOSTON
BUFFALO
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CLEVELAND
DETROIT
EL PASO
JACKSON
MIAMI
NEW YORK
OKLAHOMA CITY
PITTSBURGH
PORTLAND
SAN ANTONIO

74391

SUBMIT IMMEDIATELY PROGRESS REPORT AND CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE
INFORMANTS AS OF OCTOBER TWENTIETH.

HOOVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-13-81 BY 2842 Pmd/mc/jc

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66-2542-3-85
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 6 1941
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Initialed in Director's Office

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582 JAN 18 1954

IT VIA

Per